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ABSTRACT
Malaya's Indian Tamil Labor Diaspora: Colonial Subversion of
Their Quest for Agency and Modernity (1945-1948)
by
Patricia Spencer, Master of Arts
Utah State University, 2013
Major Professor: Dr. Edward Glatfelter
Department: History
Malaya's Indian Tamil diaspora owed its presence in the country to the British who
needed access to cheap labor for large scale agricultural projects. The most lucrative of these
projects were the rubber plantations. Economically challenged South Indian peasants from the
lowest of castes were the industry's mainstay. Their destitution and India's system of social
stratification were factors that the colonial government took advantage of. Regarded by the
British colonists and planters alike as malleable, gullible, and easily manageable, Indian laborers
were used for light, monotonous work that required very little skill. Achieving upward mobility
was an arduous and next to impossible task as the colonists found it profitable to maintain these
people as an underclass that could be exploited. Perceptions of these people as an inferior lot
with no political economy dominated the colonial narrative.
World War II was to change this perception. The veil of British superiority was removed
from the eyes of these laborers when the British lost to the Japanese. Upon their return to
Malaya after the war, the British found a more defiant Indian community. War time conditions
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severely drained Indians of their resources and left them in an impoverished and destitute
condition. However, British return to Malaya did nothing to alleviate the community's suffering
as colonial interests were solely to get the stalled rubber industry up and running again.
Laborers' demands for higher wages and better working conditions were met with
antagonism and eventually, draconian military suppression. Alliances forged with the Chinese
labor community were quickly subverted. Indian labor involvement in radical unionism which
was encouraged by the Malayan Communist Party was taken as an affront to colonial domination
and was quickly branded as a terror movement. As such, the colonial narrative was able to
maintain that resistance during this period was a terrorist movement led by communists, instead
of being a labor movement demanding rights from the British. However, an alternate narrative
should also exist in history showing that the colonial narrative was challenged by these Indians
who had embraced a modern spirit in their defiance towards their colonial masters.

(112 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
Malaya's Indian Tamil Labor Diaspora: Colonial Subversion of Their Quest
for Agency and Modernity (1945-1948)
by Patricia Spencer
The Indian labor diaspora that settled in Malaya, now known as Malaysia, was a diaspora
that was used to further colonial ambitions. Large scale agricultural projects required a
workforce that Malaya did not have. South Indian peasants from the untouchable Madrasi caste
were taken to Malaya, initially, as indentured servants. When indenture was abolished, they were
engaged as contract workers. Inferiority and backwardness were common colonial perceptions
that were held against them. These laborers were exploited by the British as they had no
bargaining power or the ability to demand more than a meager wage.
World War II redefined the way these laborers started to view the British. Having suffered
defeat in the hands of the Japanese, the colonial power retreated meekly. This was a significant
development as it removed the veil of British dominance in the eyes of a formerly docile people.
When the British returned to Malaya after the war, it was a more defiant Indian labor community
who greeted them. These wanted more concessions. They wanted citizenship, better wages and
living conditions. They wanted a future that did not retain them on the rubber estates but one
where they could finally shed their subaltern roots and achieve upward mobility.
This new defiance was met with antagonism by the colonial power whose main concern
was to get the lucrative but stalled rubber industry up and running again. The destitution and
impoverishment suffered by the Indians during the war was ignored as they were rounded up like
cattle to be put to work again on the estates.
When their demands were not met, Indian laborers joined forces with the heavily
Communist influenced Chinese migrant community to go on strikes, the strongest weapon they
had at their disposal. The creation of the All Malayan Rubber Workers' Council, a predominantly
Indian trade union, is essential in showing how Indian labor became a threat to the British that
they eventually had to retaliate with draconian military suppression through the imposition of the
Emergency in 1948.
Archival material from the Malaysian National Archives, The National Archives of the
United Kingdom, the Labor History and Archive Study Center at the People's History Museum in
the United Kingdom, and the Hull History Center in the United Kingdom, were analyzed to
present an alternate narrative as opposed to the colonial narrative, in recognizing and attributing
a modern spirit and agency amongst this formerly docile labor diaspora. This work presents the
events of 1945-1948 as a time when Indians rejected the colonial perception of them as an
inferior people, and challenged the colonial power. However, their efforts were subverted by the
British and by doing so, the British ensured the maintenance of a labor disapora that would
continue to be exploited by those who ruled over them.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“We want Indians as indentured labourers, not as free men.”
Sir Thomas Hyslop1
Sociologist Robin Cohen explains that a labor diaspora is one that develops when
there is “an expansion from a homeland in search for work, in pursuit of trade or to
further colonial ambitions.”2 The Indian labor community that settled in Malaysia is an
example of this. Although contact between Indians and Malaya existed since the preChristian era through trade, the mass migration of South Indians to Malaya and their
settlement only occurred during colonial rule. Indian laborers were brought by the British
to work the sugar and coffee plantations, and later, the rubber estates. Their sole purpose
was to provide labor capital.
Under colonial rule, Indian Tamils from the untouchable Madrasi class were
treated as tools of production in the colonial capitalist enterprise. Given their subaltern
background, it was easy for the British to manipulate them. In this thesis I will analyze
how the British viewed this Indian subaltern background and used its perceived
backwardness to the colonial power's advantage. I will also explore the significance of
World War II in Malaya and its impact on the Indian Tamil laborers. The war was
meaningful to the Malayan people as it removed the veil of dominance that the British
held in Malaya as they retreated after the Japanese defeat. When the former colonists
returned after the war, it was a more defiant Asian community that greeted them. The
nationalist struggle in India too, had tremendous influence on the Indian community in
1
2

C. Kondapi, Indians Overseas: 1838-1949 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1951), 7.
Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 57.

2
Malaya. This struggle inspired Indian Tamils to resist colonial occupation. After the war,
Indians no longer appeared docile and understood their importance to the colonial
agenda. These Indians demanded more in terms of citizenship and rights, which the
colonial rulers opposed.
Many scholars downplay the significance of the resistance put up by the Indian
labor class through their involvement in trade unionism post-World War II. This is not
surprising given that colonial attitudes and subsequent scholarship on the subject of race
during the colonial period often emphasized the Chinese migrant community as more
shrewd and militant and therefore aggressive in its demands. Colonial documents
retained the perception of Indians as “passive and unaggressive” even after the war,
referring to those involved in acts of resistance as “men of straw” under the direction of
Chinese militant groups.3 Colonial rule also worked hard at encouraging divisions
between the different races in Malaya before and after the war. The spirit of unity and cooperation between Chinese and Indians in the post-war period that actively opposed
British rule was therefore surprising to the colonial power. I will therefore look closely at
the issue of race relations between the Indian and Chinese working class in Malaya
during this time.
The Indian working class played an important role within the colonial plantation
economic structure. The plantation economy, especially the lucrative rubber industry, was
an Indian domain. Without cheap Indian labor, the British would not have been able to
enjoy a profitable rubber trade. The British needed Indian labor to begin working in the
stalled rubber industry as soon as the war ended. As such, the colonial power regarded
3

Memorandum by the Secretary of the State for the Colonies to the British Cabinet, “The Situation in
Malaya,” 1 July 1948, TNA, CAB/129/28/21, p. 116.
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Indian worker defiance and demand for higher wages after the war as troublesome.
In this thesis I will analyze the workings of a predominantly Indian trade union
called the All Malayan Rubber Workers Council (AMRWC) and the General Strike that it
organized on 25 August 1947. I will argue that the creation of this union and the
organization of the general strike was a show of Indian agency and a display of a modern
spirit amongst the Indian labor class. Although its resistance was not revolutionary, it did
force the hand of the colonial power to give in to its demands, albeit partially. I will
show how the growing defiance of the Indians and the alliance they forged with the
Chinese working class, was perceived as a great threat by the dominant power that it
responded in the harshest way possible through the imposition of the Emergency
Colonialism and Indian Migration
The story of colonialism in different parts of the world have been recounted by
many. Of the most striking ideological social categories, class and race, appear to have
driven the imperial agenda in many occasions. Indians brought to Malaya were of the
untouchable, or lower Madrasi class. As such, they were viewed and treated in a
degrading way. Even if they wanted to strip themselves of their subaltern nature, they
were not allowed to do so. It was imperative that they were maintained as a lower class so
they could be manipulated and used by the colonial power in ways that profited the
imperial enterprise. The Indian Tamil community was therefore unable to become an
entrepreneurial “mobilized diaspora.”4
Political scientist John Armstrong defines a mobilized diaspora as an ethnic group
that lacks “a general status advantage, yet which enjoys many material and cultural
4

Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction, 58.
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advantages compared to other groups in the multiethnic polity.”5 A proletarian diaspora
on the other hand is one that is defined as a diaspora with “limited communication skills
and comprises a nearly undifferentiated mass of unskilled labor with little prospect of
social mobility.”6 Unlike members of a mobilized diaspora, they did not have the
“linguistic, network, and occupational advantages to modernize and mobilize,” thereby
making themselves invaluable to the nation state.7 The Indian Tamil diaspora in Malaya
fits the description of a proletarian diaspora for historian K.S. Sandhu explains that the
Indian Tamils brought to Malaya were regarded by the colonists as “malleable, [who]
worked well under supervision, and [were] easily manageable.”8 Their main job was to
simply perform repetitive tasks that required very little skill. Given their disadvantaged
position in society, achieving upward mobility was an arduous and next to impossible
task.
Cohen asserts that a labor diaspora is transitional for no one wants to live a life of
a servant forever. I argue however that colonial authorities in Malaya robbed and
subverted any effort that the marginalized Indian Tamil community asserted after the war
in order to keep them in their subaltern state. Cohen rightfully recognizes though, that the
assertion of men and women “working a fair day's work for a fair day's pay,” is largely a
construction of the bourgeoisie.9 Such work centric aphorisms benefited colonialism as
well. Exploiting those who came from under privilege backgrounds and paying them
meager wages, in the name of giving them a better life was one of the greatest travesties
5

6
7
8

9

John A. Armstrong, “Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas,” The American Political Science Review 70,
no. 2(June 1976): 393-408.
Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction, 58.
Ibid.
Kernial Singh Sandhu, “The Coming of Indians to Malaysia,” in Indian Communities in Southeast Asia,
eds. Kernial S. Sandhu and A. Mani (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), 152.
Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction, 78.
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to have befallen marginalized communities. However, following James Scott's argument
on “public transcripts”and “hidden transcripts,” marginalized communities are quite
capable of maintaining an appearance of working with the oppressive system, i.e. the
public transcript, while imagining and at times pursuing ends that attack dominant
interests, in the hope of securing a better life.10
This thesis asserts that the Indian Tamil labor diaspora was not contented with
their meager position in society, and when they attempted to show their agency, or tried
to speak truth to power, they were subverted. The community, while maintaining an
appearance of docility for the colonists and planters, did challenge the power structure in
the hopes of making their lives better. They therefore challenged the notion that they were
weak. While numerous strikes and other forms of resistance did not ultimately lead to
major revolution, they did set the tone on how the dominant power would use the
community's new found defiant nature as an excuse to ultimately strengthen its own
oppressive hold on the labor movement through more repressive measures. As Scott says,
“Domination … can only be sustained by continuous efforts at reinforcement,
maintenance, and adjustment.”11 Although domination won, an alternative memory of
these people as being brave, strong, and bold, should also exist in the pages of history.
Colonial Attitudes on Race and Class
British incursion into Malaya began with the acquisition of Penang, an island off
the Malayan Peninsular in 1786. As the demand for natural resources such as spices,
sugar, coffee, and later 'white gold' or rubber increased in the Western world, foreign
10

11

James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1990), 2-4.
Ibid., 45.
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corporations rushed to fund and develop large scale agricultural projects in Malaya. By
1909, Britain was in firm control over the whole of Malaya. Thousands of hectares of
Malayan countryside was cleared for agricultural purposes. Unable to find local
manpower to work these projects and others, the British turned to a true, tried and tested
labor workforce - the South Indian peasants of the Indian subcontinent.12
South Indian migrants were mainly of the “untouchable or lower Madrasi caste.”
According to Sandhu, the British considered them the most “satisfactory type of laborer,
especially for light, simple, repetitive tasks.”13 Unlike the Chinese, who was the other
migrant community in Malaya at that time, Indians did not demand much in terms of
wages or working conditions. The Indian laborer settled for very little. Because they were
less likely to create problems and demand better conditions, they were a preferred lot for
the European officials and planters, especially where menial work was concerned.
Colonial presence in India had also pushed the peasant class into further poverty.
The loss of land and livelihood, forced many peasants to seek alternatives to earning a
living. Indentured servant hood offered a viable one, and suited the interests of the
colonists as well. C.L.R. James, in his research on San Domingo, described a system of
exploitation that was led by greed and a racial ideology that justified it. Similarly, early
Indian migration to Malaya was propelled by the need for labor to work sugar cane
plantations, and other municipal projects. The British, recognizing early the division of
castes in India, used that to their advantage. India's repressive system of social
stratification which divided people into different categories and discriminated between
them, gave further reason for those classified as 'untouchables' to seek a better livelihood
12
13

Sandhu, “The Coming of Indians to Malaysia,”151.
Ibid., 152.
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elsewhere, if that option was made available. This colonial landscape was an ideal
environment for exploitation. In the minds of the planters and officials, these simpletons
were “highly gullible” individuals, with no sense of “political economy,” and could
therefore, be persuaded “to go anywhere.” Although indentured laborers were said to be
bound by contract that limited their duration of employment to a few years or until all the
expenses incurred for their passage was paid off, planters often found ways to reindenture them and retain their labor. The lies and deception characterized as
“diplomacy” by C.L.R. James, coerced these laborers who either in ignorance or under
duress signed dubious contracts that bargained away their personal freedom for an
extended period of time.14 When indenture was abolished in 1910, similar methods of
coercion continued to be used to recruit cheap labor from India to Malaya. Statistics
provided by Sandhu points out that between 1786 and 1957, approximately 4.2 million
Indians entered and left Malaya. Of the 1.2 million that remained in Malaya, many died
from diseases and malnutrition. By 1957, the year of independence, the Indian population
numbered only 820, 270 of which 62.1% was local born.15
Indian labor was necessary in maintaining low production costs. Owing to the
number of unskilled laborers India could produce, it was certainly the new 'milch cow'
after the abolition of slavery in 1833. The colonial government and the plantation owners
regarded these laborers as nothing more than mere tools of production. The rubber
plantation eventually became the most profitable area for the government officials and
planters to use Indian labor. When it suited them, legislation was enacted, re-enacted,
14

15

C.L.R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution (New York:
Vintage Books, 1963), 155.
Sandhu, “The Coming of Indians to Malaysia,” 154.
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amended, or abolished to either reduce or increase the number of laborers that could
come into Malaya to work on these plantations. Workers lacking collective bargaining
power were forced by the capitalist plantation system to accept the minimum wage given
to them. Historian Michael Stenson wrote that these Indian laborers
... had almost no capacity to desert the European plantations in favor of
independent pioneering agriculture. They were ideally suited to a form of
production that had been initiated with slave labor, and which could only
survive on the basis of one form or another of bonded labor or in
situations of high population density where there was no alternative.16
Despite the fact that the rubber industry was the most lucrative money maker for
the colonial empire, Indian laborers were not able to negotiate for higher wages.
Although official documentation of exactly how much money the British Empire made
off the rubber trade is scarce and difficult to locate, some idea can be obtained from
recently released official documents from the National Archives of the United Kingdom.
In one Memorandum to the Cabinet in 1951, the Secretary for the Colonies said that
Malayan rubber and that from other Colonial territories in South-East Asia
are the Colonial Empire's most important dollar earner, and supplies are
far more than adequate to meet the needs of the United Kingdom itself.17
An earlier Memorandum from the Secretary of State to the Cabinet in 1948
concerning the Emergency situation in Malaya gives some indication on the amount of
revenue generated by Malaya and Singapore through its exports. Colonial authorities
found the emergency situation frustrating as it negatively affected the maintenance of
healthy colonial balance sheets.
16

17

Michael Stenson, Class, Race and Colonialism in West Malaysia: the Indian Case (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 1980), 17.
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the British Cabinet,“Possibilities of
Increasing the Supply of Colonial Foodstuffs and Raw Materials to the United Kingdom,” 12 Nov.
1951, TNA, CAB/129/48/14, p.55.
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Until the outbreak of the present wave of crime Malaya was, in fact, the
most peaceful country in South East Asia and had taken long strides
towards the re-establishment of stable, prosperous conditions. During
1947 the total value of the exports of Singapore and Federation together
was 151 million pounds, of which Dollar exports amounted for 56 million
pounds. It is by far the most important source of Dollars in the Colonial
Empire and it would gravely worsen the whole Dollar balance of the
Sterling Area if there were serious interference with Malayan exports.18
The Sterling Area consisted of those countries, mainly in the British
Commonwealth and Empire, whose currencies were linked to the British Pound Sterling.
Because World War II had weakened the Sterling, US Dollars were needed to help in the
recovery of the whole Sterling Area for what was called post-war rehabilitation. Dollars
earned through the sale of Malayan rubber to the United States was therefore essential to
the British. Educationist and historian, Muzafar Desmond Tate quotes Sir John Hay,
chairman of Guthrie, describing Malaya “as the largest dollar factory which we possess,”
and C. F. Cobbold, a senior British Treasury official, declaring that, “without Malaya, the
Sterling currency system as we know it would not exist.”19
According to historians Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh, members of the
proletariat known as the hewers of wood and drawers of water performed “fundamental
labors of expropriation,” and were necessary components to the success of merchant
capitalism.20 This was clearly the role of Indian labor in Malaya. Michael Stenson argues
that Indian labor was solely used for the benefit of metropolitan capitalism. He wrote
that the rise of European capitalist interests was spurred along by
18

19

20

Memorandum by the Secretary of the State for the Colonies to the British Cabinet, “The Situation in
Malaya,” 1 July 1948, TNA, CAB/129/28/21, p. 116.
Muzafar Desmond Tate, The Malaysian Indians: History, Problems and Future (Selangor: Strategic
Information and Research Development Center, 2008), 92.
Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the
Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), 42.
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official policy making, informally through the exclusive metropolitan and
colonial clubs, more formally through regular consultations in London
between the Rubber Growers Association, mining interests and the
Colonial Office, and by representation in Malaya on all relevant official
councils and boards.21
The British used the Indian and Chinese migrant races to expropriate the resources
of Malaya. The sovereignty of Malay rulers was preserved through “elaborate
ceremonial, lavish pensions and a position in the colonial bureaucracy” which appeased
them and allowed the colonial power to do as it pleased. Likewise, the Malay peasantry
was also kept out of the export economy as estate laborers and were encouraged instead
to work in the rice fields. This was a way of ensuring food supplies for the Chinese and
Indian labor force while reinforcing “peasant conservatism.”22 While the British on the
outside looked like they were advancing the Malay position, in reality the colonial
government was merely pacifying the Malay rulers and keeping them satisfied so it
could ultimately use the Indian and Chinese labor workforce to extract the rich resources
of Malaya for its own economic benefit.
Sociologist R.K. Jain wrote about the creation of a three tiered class structure on
the estates - the managerial class made up of the Europeans, the Asian supervisory class
made up of Malayalees and Ceylonese, and the proletariat Tamil class.23 While the
European planters disassociated themselves from the Tamil laborers, the Asian
supervisory class usually had day to day dealings with the Tamil laborers. By virtue of
their educational attainment, they received better wages and were able to send their
children to English schools, thereby assuring upward mobility for their future
21
22
23

Stenson, Class, Race and Colonialism in West Malaysia: the Indian Case, 30.
Ibid., 30.
Ravindra K. Jain, South Indians on the Plantation Frontier in Malaya (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1970).
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generations. In contrast, the Tamil class received sub-standard education using only the
Tamil language as a medium of instruction, and that also at an elementary level up to
Primary Six. Providing a decent education to the children of estate workers was not a
priority to estate employers, since it would have been costly. The colonial authorities did
not put pressure on estate employers to provide a satisfactory educational system. It was
in fact pressure from the Indian Government that introduced the “Labour Code of 1923
that made it obligatory for rubber planters to provide educational facilities if there were
ten or more resident children of school going age of six to twelve years.”24 Resentful of
the obligatory nature of the said law, planters ensured that the education provided was
minimal and ineffective in ensuring upward mobility for these children. Children of
rubber tappers and weeders were destined to live as their parents with the only
improvement being that they could perform the same tasks, marginally better, as was
observed by E.T. Thompson. Writing on education in the colonial owned plantations, he
stated:
The educational policy of the planter class is to insure that the children
of plantation laborers will remain plantation laborers. If education there
must be, let it be an education designed to make hewers of wood and
drawers of water better hewers of wood and drawers of water.25
Another strong labor force that was present in Malaya during this same era was
the Chinese. Hardworking, with strong cultural connections, and most importantly,
coming as free men to a foreign land to “seek a fortune,” they earned better wages, were
feared to an extent by the British, and were respected for their work ethics and resolute
24

25

Edgar T. Thompson, “Comparative Education in Colonial Areas with Special Reference to Plantation
and Mission Frontiers,” American Journal of Sociology 40, no. 2(May 1943): 710-21, quoted in
Thangavelu Marimuthu, “The Plantation School as an Agent of Social Reproduction,”in Indian
Communities in Southeast Asia, eds. K.S. Sandhu, and A. Mani (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 2006), 468.
Ibid., 468.
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mind. While the Chinese came to Malaya to make a fortune, the South Indian laborer
came to earn a wage, for this was a better path than his continued miserable existence in
his homeland. Being defined by a caste system that was forced upon him also made him
an easily exploitable creature. The British took advantage of this fact by the wage
structure it implemented on the plantations. Low wages were essential in ensuring high
profit maximization, and unlike the Chinese who could and would negotiate for a higher
wage, the South Indian laborer would not. A Memorandum by the Secretary of State for
the Colonies to the British Cabinet in 1951 described the Chinese community with great
admiration.
The Chinese, ... are found in all activities of the country - in rubber and
tin, as common laborers, as agriculturalists, as proprietors of rubber
estates (20 per cent of the rubber on smallholdings and 17 per cent of
that on estates is Chinese owned) and of the mines (40 per cent of the
production of tin is Chinese owned), as merchants, as contractors, as
shopkeepers (of whom they constitute much of the greater part), as
bankers and as traders. Every year they gain greater economic strength
and increase their hold over the wealth of the country .... highly
sophisticated, urbane, shrewd, politically aloof and inscrutable. They are
mostly absentee landlords with no following in the villages or among the
mass of their fellow-countrymen ..... It is stimulating to argue or
negotiate with them but they are generally politicians without
constituencies, leaders without followers, remote from the problem,
trimming adroitly, ready sometimes with advice and almost always with
criticism, but not prepared to lead or even to exhort.26
In contrast, he had nothing but two lines to say about the Indians.
The Indians, mostly Tamils, provide a good deal of the unskilled labor of
the country, many tapping rubber and a few working in the dredging or
hydraulicing of tin.27
This mixture of admiration and fear of the Chinese that was held by the British
26

27

Memorandum by the Secretary of the State for the Colonies to the British Cabinet, “Malaya,” 21
December 1951, TNA, CAB/129/48/59, p. 239A.
Ibid., 239A.
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was also one of the reasons the migration of Indian labor into Malaya was encouraged
by the colonial power. Some scholars have argued that the separation of labor along racial
lines was a powerful way to play one racial group against the other. To have allowed the
Chinese greater control over the economy and greater strength in terms of numbers would
have severely weakened the position of the British in Malaya, and also risked the Malays
losing their claim over the land. The most significant reason the British played the race
card remained the maintenance of a low wage structure that ensured profit maximization
in the colonial plantation economy. Robert N. Jackson, the Deputy Secretary of the
Ministry of the Interior cites the following statement in his monograph as an example of
the “contemporary point of view of Europeans planters” regarding Malaya's migrant
labor community.
To ensure your independence, work with Javanese and Tamils, and, if you
have sufficient experience, also with Malays and Chinese; you can then
always play the one against the other ... In case of a strike, you will never
be left without labor, and the coolies of one nationality will think twice
before they make their terms, if they know that you are in a position that
you can do without them.28
A firm racial ideology was therefore obvious from the way these two migrant
groups were treated by the colonizer. Historian David Roediger's statement about “beaten
men from beaten races,” as “deficient individuals, as a class, and as a race, they
represented the worst failure in the struggle for existence,” could have most certainly
been used to refer to the Indian Tamils in place of the Irish, or Greeks, or Southern
Italians.29 The perception held by the British towards the Indians in Malaya was that they
28

29

Selangor Journal 4 (1895):438, quoted in Robert N. Jackson, Immigrant Labor and the Development of
Malaya (Federation of Malaya: Government Press, 1961), 104.
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were a deficient people. Applying Edward Said's idea of reading 'contrapuntally' to the
above description of the races offered by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, an
attitude belying the Secretary's own prejudice of holding one race in admiration and the
other in disregard, is evident.
While the British was successful in using the race card before the war to its
advantage, this thesis will show that the colonial power found difficulty in trying to
continue playing the same card after the war. The alliance between the Indians and
Chinese that was encouraged by The All Malayan Rubber Workers Council proved
effective in forcing the British to give in to the demands of the working class. The
migrant races had learned that collective bargaining was possible. A unified front was the
only way to stand up to the dominant power. Although the concessions on the part of the
colonial power were minimal, the British worried about how it would embolden the
working class and strengthen this new Indian/Chinese alliance. While previously the
British only had to worry about the militant nature of the Chinese, now the Indians gave
them a cause for concern too as they took on a more defiant nature. Indian community
involvement in radical trade unionism gave these laborers a space to not only voice their
grievances but also courage to face their colonial oppressors. The Indian/Chinese
working class unity coupled with this new Indian consciousness was not something the
colonial capitalist enterprise could afford after the war.
The Impact of Colonialism on the Indian Community
in Modern Day Malaysia
Colonialism deeply impacted the countries that it touched. The legacies of

15
colonialism lives on in many ways till today in these former colonies such as in the
classification of people, the division of borders, the set up of government structures, the
attitudes towards race relations, and others. Independence in Malaya did nothing to uplift
the state of the Indian Tamil proletariat. The discrimination held towards them carried on
even after the departure of the British. Lacking proper citizenship papers, many Indians
continued to live illegally in a country that their forefathers called home. Unable the
enjoy the vital benefits of citizenship such as education that would have enabled gainful
employment, many remained stuck in a vicious cycle of poverty and destitution. It is not
surprising therefore that a large number of Indians have fallen into crime and considers it
an acceptable way of life. Poverty in itself is a crime and crime is a sore that appears in a
diseased society when disparity among members of the society pushes those in the
poorest category to a way of life that's criminal.
Today Malaysian prisons are filled with Indian men incarcerated for various forms
of crime. Without their breadwinners, families struggle to survive and continue to lose
more members to a life of crime, reminiscent of what French lawyer Charles Lucas said,
that
the same order that send the head of the family to prison reduces each
day the mother to destitution, the children to abandonment, the whole
family to vagabondage and begging. It is this way that crime can take
root.30
In order to understand the problems facing the Indian community in modern day
Malaysia, one must consider their history for it is a sad history that is wrought with
prejudices and discrimination. It is truly a legacy of colonialism that has been passed
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down. This work draws attention to a time when Indian Tamils fought against the
perceptions held towards them and tried to take control of their future, by forming
alliances and resisting colonial rule. It was a show of agency that was denied by the
dominant power of that time and subsequently by those who wrote the history of Malaya.
In Chapter 2, the different nationalisms that emerged out of the war period in
Malaya will be explored. The anti-imperial sentiments felt by the migrant Indian and
Chinese communities moved them to demand independence from colonial rule as this
would have meant citizenship, and democratic representation for them.
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CHAPTER 2
POST-WAR NATIONALISMS
This chapter explores the two different nationalisms that emerged in Malaya after
World War II. One brand of nationalism united all races in Malaya and was especially
empowering to the Indian and Chinese migrant communities who wanted full citizenship
rights in Malaya. The other, was a product of fear amongst the Malay elite who felt that
their position as “sons of the soil” would be threatened if the migrant races were given
the same privileges as them. They used this fear to mobilize the Malay peasantry into
forming a strong Malay nationalism that eventually gained the support of the British as
well.
World War II was a redefining moment in Malaya. As the Japanese advanced into
the country, the Malayan people saw for the first time, the weakened state of the British.
Unable to hold its ground, the imperial power left Malaya with its tail between its legs. It
armed the Malayan People's Anti Japanese Army (MPAJA) with artillery and
ammunition, leaving them to defend their own lives, resources (even those of the
colonists and planters), and the country. By this time too, the Indian and Chinese migrant
communities had developed a kind of nationalism that propelled them to feel a sense of
belonging and therefore, a more militant attitude in wanting to defend Malaya. These
were no longer seasonal workers using the country to earn a living while having their
patriotism lie elsewhere, but people who were born in Malaya and who had made a
conscious choice to stay in Malaya. They regarded themselves as Malayan citizens,
though officially they had not gained that recognition yet. The nationalism and struggle
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for independence in India were especially inspiring for the Indian laborers. Their own
general discontent with low wages and poor living conditions under imperial rule were
significant factors by themselves to resist imperial domination.
The Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945 was to liberate the most radical
groups in Malaya. The predominantly Chinese, Malayan Peoples Anti Japanese Army
(MPAJA) which was formed prior to the war to defend the country, had also very
successfully integrated Indians and Malays into the army. By organizing itself as a multiracial army of Malays, Chinese, and Indians, representative of all professions, it showed
that unity among the races was possible. All that was needed was a common experience
to unite the different races. The war which was merciless on all of Malaya provided that
avenue. This army consisted of “20,000 people and [included] 7 regiments.” These
“fought 282 major battles in which they accounted for 5,000 Japanese.”31 The political
counterpart of the army, The Malayan People's Anti Japanese Union (MPAJU), organized
passive resistance in the towns. It was in this that the Malayan Communist Party (MCP),
had tremendous influence. People's Councils or Committees were formed by the MCP
who worked in conjunction with the MPAJA to prevent widespread sabotage and
destruction by the Japanese as they were leaving the country. In the crucial days after the
Japanese surrender and before the arrival of the British Military Administration (BMA), it
was these Councils and the MPAJA that “maintained peaceful conditions, ran municipal
affairs and looked after the day to day life of the people.”32 Although the MPAJA and
31
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MPAJU were initially organized to combat Japanese imperialism, it was not long before a
radical nationalism and the spirit of anti-imperialism was directed towards the British, a
cause into which a growing number of the Indian and Chinese working class readily
threw themselves.
Many of the Indians who had served in the Indian National Army(INA) and the
Indian Independence League(IIL) during the war, believed in the message of Subhas
Chandra Bose, an Indian Nationalist leader, that they were to fight British imperialism
with the help of the Japanese and liberate India. However, they found themselves being
“allocated defensive positions in support of Japanese imperialism against Allied
invasion.” Many of these Indians gave up the little they had to support Bose's cause. A
large number were forced to be involved in the construction of the Siam-Burma railway
that took many lives. In the end, Japanese imperialism became as oppressive as British
rule and these Indians found themselves exploited again. Disillusioned and impoverished,
these Indians were attracted to the MPAJA.33 To them, the exhortation by the MPAJU to
“demand more rice and better pay” from the colonial power at the end of the occupation
was especially appealing.34
Apart from being disillusioned with Bose's message and methods, these Indians
also knew that upon the return of the British, they would be punished for their alliance,
forced or not, with the Japanese. The idea of liberating Malaya from imperialism was an
exciting and hopeful thought, if it meant liberating themselves as well. Stenson writes
that given a choice between the two imperialisms, many Indians preferred the British,
who were “leafleting the country with messages of hope for rebuilding 'a new and better
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country' that would be a 'real homeland for all those who live in it.'”35 The true intentions
of the British were not yet known to Malayans. Although the MPAJA was officially
disbanded on 1 December, 1945, its members continued to take part in many of the
radical organizations of that time, namely the MCP, the Malayan Democratic Union, and
the Malay Nationalist Party.
The Return of Colonial Rule to Malaya
The British Military Administration (BMA) was given a great welcome upon its
arrival in Malaya. Its stated intent was to take over administration of the country and
maintain order before completely handing over to a civil authority. It was soon apparent
that there was a clash in aims. The BMA wished for a “return to 1939; the Malayans, on
the other hand, because of their experience of 1941-1945, knew there could be no
returning to the old Colonial system.”36 Although the British were aware that the
perceptions in Malaya towards them had changed, they were undeterred. They were
confident in their ability to control Malaya once again for as C.L.R. James wrote, “Those
in power never give way, and admit defeat only to plot and scheme to regain their lost
power and privilege.”37
The BMA's policy regarding Malaya was apparent in a number of ways. First,
they offered no compensation to the holders of Japanese currency which was repudiated,
although “large quantities of pre-1942 currency were recaptured in the Japanese
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controlled banks.” Secondly, ignoring the impoverishment of the Malayan population
during the war, the BMA did not put into place price controls or rationing for essentials
such as rice, which led to much of this being sold on black markets at inflated prices,
leaving only “...less than 10% of the population getting a minimum subsistence diet.”
Malaya was also not allowed to import foodstuffs from outside the Sterling Block. Prior
to the war Malaya imported 60% of its foodstuffs.38 For the Indian laboring class, this
was especially difficult as their loss of livelihood during the war and their forced
participation on the Japanese Siam-Burma “death railway” project, had left many
families without breadwinners and thus, with hardly any food. Yet, they were expected to
return to the estates to jump start the stalled rubber industry.
One of the earliest tasks of the BMA, instead of stabilizing the country and
helping the people, was to try and dismantle any sort of unionism that was being
encouraged. Aware of the MCP's effort in trying to consolidate an Indian/Chinese
working class, the BMA upheld the 1941 repressive legislation against unions. It made it
difficult for groups to organize and have meetings, requiring them instead to register
themselves and obtain permission for meetings to be held. A typical BMA proclamation
stated:
Any person who:a) publishes, circulates, or has in his possession with intent to publish
or circulate any printed or written matter which is in the interests of the
enemy or which is hostile and detrimental to the British
Administration, the Forces or any of the United Nations; or
b) utter any speech or words hostile or detrimental to the British Military
Administration, the Forces or any of the United Nations,
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shall on conviction be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term
not exceeding seven years or with fine not exceeding 3,000 dollars or
with both such imprisonment and fine.39
This was clearly not the democratic approach the Malayan people were waiting
for. It was obvious that the imperial power imposed these sort of proclamations to
prevent situations where a consensus of grievances could be reached. These meeting
places were rife social sites much like the “hush arbors” of the slaves, and any highly
charged social site is a threat to the powers that be. As Scott says, “Large, autonomous
gatherings are threatening to domination because of the license they promote among
normally disaggregated inferiors.”40 Gatherings like these needed to be prevented at all
cost. The behavior of the British too is in line with how dominant powers maintain their
position, through “sustained … efforts at reinforcement, maintenance and adjustment.”41
A Working Class Alliance
Indian laborers who began to see the value in what the MPAJA and by extension
the MCP, was doing, banded together with the Chinese to form General Labor Unions
(GLUs). This involvement in unions was a first for the community. The Chinese working
class on the other hand, had already established “unions” for themselves long before the
war through their involvement in triads and secret societies. Belonging to such groups
gave them protection and afforded them the necessary support when they needed to make
demands of the British, one of the reasons therefore why they were feared by the British.
The British recognized that these organizations having “power over life and death over its
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members,” were never to be trifled with.42 The Chinese also belonged to guilds. These
were probably similar to trade unions and “settled rates of wages, hours of work, holidays
and terms of apprenticeship, and in addition provided friendly benefits.”43 Akin to the
European craft guilds in the Middle Ages, these provided apprenticeship for those who
wanted to learn particular crafts. It was not until the 1920s that organizations specifically
for employees began to be established. Known as Mutual Benefit Societies, their
main purpose was social rather than industrial, but whose ulterior or
secondary motive was the maintenance or improvement of the status and
conditions of their members as employees.44
Chinese trade unions developed from these mutual benefit societies.
Unlike the Chinese, Indians never had associations that they belonged to until
shortly before the war. These were formed along caste lines or along “a particular
territorial division of Southern India.” Their “objects were social, educational or
cultural,” or for “the general improvement of the members.”45 Indian unionism in the
form of their involvement in the GLUs was therefore a first for the community. The
intention of the GLUs was to bridge the racial divide among the two migrant
communities and mobilize labor throughout the country as the awareness of the
importance of cheap labor to the British Empire, began to grow. The GLUs thus
consolidated “a new Chinese/Indian working-class alliance.”46
To this was added the support of the Malays through links with the Malay
Nationalist Party (MNP). Though the latter's objectives were not completely in line with
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the MCP, “there was sufficient common ground in their joint opposition to colonialism to
provide a basis for continuing, if uneasy, co-operation.”47 Eventually, the major flaw of
the MCP was to not have included the Malays enough. It should have strengthened the
alliance between the Chinese/Indian working class with the Malay peasantry. Communal
separateness ultimately drove a wedge between any sort of mobilization that would have
effectively included all three races. The Malays, deeply insecure about their position and
driven by their fear of the Chinese, took on a violent stance against them. Stenson wrote
that, “violent and often indiscriminate Malay attacks upon the Chinese began in
November 1945 and continued sporadically on the west coast until June of 1946.”48
Although the MCP was predominantly Chinese and appeared to the Malays, as a
Chinese party that did not do much in allaying Malay fears and gaining their trust, the
role of the British in exacerbating the racial situation through its introduction of a new
constitution, is often overlooked. The British had always played the race card in Malaya
counting on the fact that communal separatism was a difficult hurdle to overcome.
However, archival evidence reveal that although communal separatism was a hurdle, it
was not impossible to overcome for there were times when all three communities worked
together with a common purpose. Documents archived at the People's History Museum in
the United Kingdom about post-war Malaya reveal that the British was constantly
working to subvert alliances and provoke tensions, that ultimately succeeded in disempowering the people. The final thrust in achieving communal separatism between the
Malays and the former migrant communities came with the introduction of the British
proposed Malayan Union constitution. The Malayan Union constitution had all the
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appearances of fulfilling the former migrant races desire of becoming Malayan citizens.
Although it fell short of truly bestowing all the benefits of citizenship on the Chinese and
Indians, it was considered enough of an affront to the Malays for them to vehemently
oppose it. The Malays, already feeling alienated by the Chinese and insecure about their
own position took this constitution as an attack on their sovereignty. This then led to a
strong Malay nationalism that forced the British to swiftly abandon the Malayan Union in
order to propose another constitution that heavily favored and upheld the position of the
Malays. As a result, the Chinese and Indian working class found their interests abandoned
and were left to fend for themselves.
The Malayan Union Constitution and the Federal Constitution
The Malayan Union constitution warrants a little more discussion in this section
as the Indian and Chinese migrant communities had placed much hope in it when it was
first introduced by the British on 10 October 1945. The Chinese and Indians expected
this new constitution to grant them citizenship and all the benefits that went with it. On
the part of the imperial power though, this proposal was an attempt to centralize and
consolidate the governing of the country. This proposal decided that the Malay States and
the Settlements of Penang and Malacca would be absorbed into the Union, and be
administered as a British Colony. The Chinese and Indian migrant population would then
be eligible for citizenship under this new constitution. The official statement of policy in
January 1946 explained that the pre-war style of administration, while effective for that
time, was no longer appropriate. The colonial power made its intent clear in 1946 in its
policy statement that
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.... the increasing complexity of modern administrative, economic
and social developments demand a system of government less
cumbersome, more adequate for large common services, and making
better use of time and labor.49
The British wanted a system of administration that cut through bureaucratic red
tape and eliminated the need for involvement by local authorities i.e. Malay rulers. This
system would be solely administered by the British at their discretion. This emphasis on
efficiency was with the immediate needs of capitalism in mind, and the dependence of
capitalism on a strong migrant labor force who wanted a stake in the country. As Stenson
noted,
The wartime planners finally accepted the political consequences of a
capitalist economic structure which was absolutely dependent upon (or
so the British believed) the retention of a large stable Chinese and Indian
labor force.50
The planners of the Malayan Union were so focused on getting the machinery of
capitalism going again that they underestimated the resistance of the Malay Sultans to the
whole scheme. That the Sultans who had enjoyed special privileges all this time were not
about to transfer their sovereignty to the British Crown, overnight, was somehow a
matter that was prematurely overlooked. Furthermore, the influence of the Sultans on the
Malay peasantry was also imprudently dismissed. The general attitude of the British was
one of insensitivity and arrogance. This can be seen in a Memorandum written by the
Secretary of the State for the Colonies to the British Cabinet on 4 October, 1945, prior to
the introduction of the Malayan Union where he appears adamant about the British
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position. He said,
We cannot allow ourselves to be to be deterred by an obstinate
attitude on the part of any or all of the Malay rulers with whom Sir
Harold MacMichael will have to deal in his forthcoming mission .....
His Majesty's Government should now affirm their intention to carry
through in spite of obstruction on the part of any particular Malay
Ruler, the policy which they have approved..... All our plans for the
Malay States depend upon the success of Sir Harold MacMichael's
efforts to secure jurisdiction in each and all of the States. It is
essential that his hand should be strengthened by the firm assurance
that he can, if necessary, make it clear to any recalcitrant Sultan that
we intend to carry our policy through.51
The imperial policy of playing the race game was apparent once again in the
introduction of this new constitution. The British recognized that the migrant
community, especially the Chinese who were now largely “communist,” had the same
goal “which corresponds in very many respects with our own [British] policy.”52 The
new constitution was therefore a way to appease the migrant community and cajole them
back to their respective estates and plantations by dangling the opportunity for citizenship
in front of them. However, the British underestimated the reaction of the Malay sultanate
to this new plan.
Feeling threatened about losing their own position of power and not necessarily
the rights of the Malay peasantry, the Sultans led by Dato Onn bin Jaafar, united to
oppose the Malayan Union. It is interesting to note here the role of Dato Onn bin Jaafar
as a friend of the British. Used to playing the race card, the British ensured that its
position was always secure no matter which way the decision went. In the event that the
Malayan Union failed, the British had to make sure that it was aligned with the Malay
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elite. The British had always enjoyed a special relationship with the Malay elite of the
country. In order to have exploited Malaya's resources, the colonial power paid tributes
and pensions to the Malay sultanate to appease them. Therefore, when the sultanate rose
in opposition to the Malayan Union, it was fairly easy for the British to abandon the
Union and fall in line once again with the Malay elite because of this past relationship.
By promising the Malay elite special privileges, the British were able to gain their
confidence and support. A manuscript written by an unknown author archived at the
People's History Museum states that Dato Onn was propped up as a seeming national
hero among the Malays. It further stated that the British authorities extended Dato Onn
every possible co-operation while
.... giving him the necessary facilities for extensive political
activities. The slogan 'Malaya for the Malays' is encouraged by
Dato Onn to distract the Malay masses from the truly democratic
path towards national liberation and democracy, and to prevent
them from realizing the urgent necessity to unite with the Chinese
and Indians in order to achieve liberation.53
His influence was significant as he was able to mobilize the Malay peasantry to
hold protests all over the country. The mobilization of the Malay peasantry was a death
blow to whatever hopes of a multi-racial alliance that any group may have had. The final
act of defiance was the boycott of the inauguration of the new constitution by the rulers
on 1 April 1946.54
From the outside, the Malayan Union appeared to have had all the right elements
for the successful building of a pluralistic nation. It appeared as if the imperial power
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truly had the interests of the people in its heart. The same memorandum quotes the
Secretary saying that now was the time “to fulfill our duty towards Malaya and its
people.” He affirmed that the destiny of the country was that “of eventual selfgovernment within the British Commonwealth, a destiny to which all of the inhabitants
of Malaya can contribute.” It appeared from this memorandum as if the migrant races
were now true citizens of Malaya, and as such would enjoy all the benefits of that
citizenship. The Secretary asserted,
The essential rights of the Malays must be safeguarded, but
henceforth each of the races forming the population of Malaya must
have full opportunity of helping build the country's future, of
developing and enjoying on a basis of common effort and common
opportunity the great material wealth of the Peninsular, and of
reaping the benefit of their efforts, provided they in fact regarded
Malaya as an object of loyalty. They must be citizens of Malaya, with
all the rights and obligations which that term implies. No one must
rely on past privilege, or regard Malaya simply as a source of
material wealth. While it is to the advantage of all the world, and not
only Malaya, that the production of her mineral and agricultural
resources should be restored and developed by industry and research,
it is right that the Malayan people should be assured of their share in
the rewards of their industry and should be able to feel the country's
wealth reflected in their own fuller standard of life.55
However, the true intent of the British was to appease the Chinese and Indians for
its own purposes. By ignoring the need for diplomacy with the Sultans, the colonial
power ensured the swift demise of the Malayan Union. At the first sign of trouble, the
British, afraid of the connections that could be made with the militant Indonesian
independence movement, abandoned the Union to begin negotiations solely with the
Malays. J. de V. Allen, the most quoted researcher on the subject, asserted that the Union

55

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the British Cabinet, “Policy Regarding
Malaya,” 4 October, 1945, TNA, CAB/129/2, p. 5.

30
failed because it did not receive the support of the Chinese and Indians.56 He argued that
they looked upon it with apathy because their true allegiances lay outside Malaya, i.e. in
China and India. Michael Stenson corrected this argument and suggests that if Allen had
read the Indian and Chinese newspapers at that time, he would have come to a very
different conclusion. The conclusion by the Chinese press was that while the proposal
seemed to address citizenship equality, it did not do enough to touch on the essence of the
matter. The essence was “democratic representation.”57
The same could be applied to the Indian presses who “consistently called for
fully representative politics based upon a universal franchise and leading to
independence.”58 The argument was that had Allen taken the time to really study how
the migrant communities felt about their place in Malaya, he would have concluded that
these were people whom, by this time, had truly invested themselves in Malaya.
Instead, by placing emphasis on what he thought was their lack of loyalty, Allen failed
to recognize “the changing nature of Chinese and Indian involvement in Malaya” and
their retention in Malaya as being crucial to the British economic enterprise.59
The Malayan Union proposition therefore failed not just because the Malays
opposed it but because it “neglected to satisfy the aspirations and arouse the enthusiasm
of the very groups to which it was most designed to appeal.”60 But, the colonial power
was prepared for either eventuality.
When considering the failure of the Union, an important analysis that has been
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overlooked is the role of the British in setting the tone on how racial dynamics would
eventually be played out. The British, concerned only with its own immediate economic
interests, either purposely blinded themselves or failed to see that by abandoning the
Malayan Union so quickly and completely siding with the Malays, they were in fact
creating a potentially problematic future situation. A situation that in a plural society
such as Malaya, would be difficult to overcome, especially for the minority and weakest
among the races, the Indian Tamils. Because of their history of marginalization, the
perceptions held against them as being weak and having a retarded consciousness, their
own communal divisions, and the sheer fact that unlike the Chinese, they did not have
the strength in numbers, it was a grave error. Worse still, it was an irresponsible and
malicious act on the part of the colonial power to have abandoned what could have
possibly been something better for the Indians. If the Malayan Union Constitution had
been written or reworked with the intent of preparing Malayans of all races for true selfgovernance and independence, for equal citizenship, and for betterment of the Malayan
people as a whole, it would have had a very different response. However, it was written
with selfish motives and as such was never going to receive the support of the people.
In February 1948, The Federation of Malaya Constitution replaced the
Malayan Union. It was a product of secret negotiations solely between the British and
the Malays. This time, the unity that was shown by the Malays under the United
Malays National Organization (UMNO) banner in their opposition to the Malayan
Union, was replicated by the Chinese and Indians who “.. on the constitutional issue
demonstrated an impressive measure of unity during the whole of 1947.”61 That year
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was rife with opposition from the Chinese and Indians who were responsible for
organizing rallies and demonstrations, which culminated in a widespread work stoppage
in October. A countrywide general strike or “hartal” was organized on October 20,
1947 in protest of this undemocratic constitution, leading to a complete business
stoppage throughout the country, as well as closure of schools for a day. This
subsequently led to many more work stoppages throughout the country at different
times. An article from an unknown source archived at the People's History Museum
states:
The unanimous stoppage in October, was held in the face of government
intimidation, the Governor of the Malayan Union having threatened
forfeiture of pay and disciplinary action against government servants
participating.62
While organizing themselves to protest, the Indian and Chinese communities also
struggled with their own distractions, that unbeknownst to them were being
manipulated by the colonial authorities towards their own ends.
The visit of Jawarhalal Nehru in March 1946 was a major distraction for the
Indian community. Nehru, while struck by the way that Indian labor had been organized
under the GLUs, was cautious in his praise, as the Indian National Congress had only
recently expelled the Indian Communist Party. With his nationalist approach of 'India
first for Indians,' it is probable that he would have encouraged that Indian labor be
extricated from Communist influence. An article written by an unknown source
archived at the Labour History Archive and Study Center in the People's History
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Museum, states that
the hospitality extended to Nehru by Louis Mountbatten when the former
was touring Malaya was only meant to deceive the Malayan Indians......
Some of the Congress political mongers are attempting to organize a
single Pan-Malayan organization of the Indians. By this they are trying to
disrupt the Pan-Malayan General Trade Union in which the Malayan
organized workers of respective nationalities have united together.63
This was an unfortunate stance to have been taken because when India did obtain her
independence the following year, it was Nehru himself who distanced India from her
overseas communities, saying,
We have left to the Indians abroad whether they continue to remain
nationals or to adopt the nationality of whichever country they live in. It
is entirely for them to decide. If they remain Indian nationals, then all
they can claim abroad is favorable alien treatment. If they adopt the
nationality of the country they live in, they should associate themselves
as closely as possible with the interest of the people of the country they
have adopted and never […] become an exploiting agency there.
(emphasis added)64
Obviously, Indian nationalism was not beneficial for the Malayan Indians who
were living in a pluralistic situation. It should have only served its purpose as a point of
inspiration. With leadership that constantly turned to India for advice, it created
suspicion among the Chinese and Malays who began to doubt their allegiance and that of
the community as a whole. With the obstacles the Indians had before them, it would have
served them better if they had been part of a strong local racially united front.
The Chinese on the other hand had to contend with the negative publicity they
were getting from the involvement of some amongst them in the Kuomintang. The same
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article from the Labour History Archive and Study Center in the People's History
Museum stated:
Among the Chinese, the authorities are making use of the reactionary
Kuomintang clique to disrupt unity by slandering the Communist Party
with every means in their hands. Being adequately financed, the
Kuomintang is rather active among the upper and medium strata of the
Chinese community. Although such activities of the Kuomintang still
does not constitute as a serious menace to the democratic movement, but
positive measure are adopted to nip it at the bud.65
The MCP could have had greater influence on the outcome of the situation, if it
had not been busy with the reorganization of its party. It would have understood the real
significance of the secret negotiations that were taking place between the British and the
Malay rulers. When it did, however, it moved quickly
.. and succeeded by means of the Malayan Democratic Union in forming
in December 1946 an at least nominally multiracial alliance in the shape
of the All Malay Council of Joint Action (later the AMCJA-PUTERA) to
demand both the retention of liberal citizenship provisions and the rapid
introduction of democratic, representative politics.66
Although there were acknowledged weaknesses with this coalition because of the many
uneasy compromises, this was still a better alternative than the Federation of Malaya
Constitution. It was, in some sense, the true essence of democracy. The combined
number of people in this front was
estimated to include some 600,000. It represented the majority of the
Malayan people, but was nevertheless completely ignored during the
government's pretense of 'consulting' the people about the proposed
constitutional change.67
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The MCP, although itself not part of the AMCJA-PUTERA coalition, nevertheless had
tremendous influence on the various groups especially the Pan-Malayan Federation of
Trade Unions. It agreed with the principles that were put forward by the AMCJA namely
that of “responsible self-government through a fully-elected Central Legislature” for the
whole country, and “equal citizenship rights for all who make Malaya their permanent
home and the object of their undivided loyalty.” 68
By this time though, the British were no longer interested in being
accommodating in any way. The colonial power took great strides in pointing out
“differing objectives of the various groups comprising the AMCJA-PUTERA [while
neglecting to look at the commonalities between them].” This was also the colonial
power's opportunity to “label the agitation with the communist smear.”69 By doing so the
British effectively killed the hopes of the various groups under the AMCJA-PUTERA
coalition. The branding of the agitation with the smear of communism was an especially
vicious act as it gave the authorities a blank check to deal harshly with whatever political
opposition they regarded as subversive. As Stenson concludes,
The ideal of a potentially independent multi-racial Malayan nation was
relegated to the dustbin while the British devoted all their energies to the
more congenial tasks of economic and administrative rehabilitation.70
In conclusion, the nationalism that emerged out of this and continued to grow in
Malaya was one that created inequalities in Malayan citizenship. It formed a hierarchy in
in which the Malays sat at the very top, and by virtue of their position was thus able to
enjoy all the benefits of citizenship. The others races could never claim this for
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themselves. Instead of a nationalism that could have emerged out of a sense of
“fraternity” in resisting colonial rule, what did come into being was a nationalism that
according to Claudio Lomnitz, distinguished “full citizens from part citizens or strong
citizens from weak ones.”71 In the case of the nationalism that arose in Malaya, Lomnitz's
critique of Benedict Anderson thus holds true, that “nationalism does not form a single
imaginary community.”72 The British in complicity with the ruling elite class in Malaya
created a situation of inequality that clearly benefited the Malays over the other races,
effectively destroying the aspirations of those who wanted a successful plural society
built on equality.
Chapter 3 will explore the emergence of class consciousness and agency among
Indian Tamil laborers after the failure of the Malayan Union. Reasons for this class
consciousness will be looked at. Recognizing their place as a deprived class, these
laborers united themselves under the banner of radical unionism in order to resist
colonial oppression and voice their demands for better pay and working conditions.
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CHAPTER 3
CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE EMERGENCE OF
AGENCY AMONG INDIAN LABORERS
With the introduction of the new constitution, the working class continued to
exercise its demands through its participation in trade unions. Disappointed with the
political outcome, Indian Tamil laborers turned to radical unionism. Their demands and
hopes for democratic representation were directly tied to their working and living
conditions. When the possibility of true democratic representation was thrown out the
window, these Indians had no other choice but to voice their demands through the
unions with the hopes of improving their lives.
Historian Amarjit Kaur argues that “worker action and organization … took
different forms and proceeded unevenly.” With the eventual creation of the National
Union of Plantation Workers (NUPW), any sort of labor militancy was quashed as
union leaders “imposed constraints upon the activities of the workers and their greater
social status over the laborers impaired worker unity.” As a result, she concluded that
there was “no real alliance of class and probably not much class consciousness in the
rubber plantation industry in Malaya.”73 While she is right in that the creation of the
NUPW advocated conservative trade unionism and was in line with the imperial
agenda, she is wrong to assume that there was no class consciousness or class alliance
in the rubber plantation industry.
Documents from the Labor History Archive and Study Center in the People's
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History Museum reveal the opposite. While issues with sub-communal separatism was
always present, for the working class who also represented the largest group among the
Indians, namely the Tamil laborers, the same problems met them day after day. Their
labor was being exploited on the estates and plantations. Their wages were constantly
subject to the commodities market and their livelihoods were always under threat by
other labor groups that could be employed at any time to keep them in line. Regardless
of the leadership problems within the community, labor had only one concern – making
their lives better, and to that end they fought. These Indians were exploited because
they were unable to shed their subaltern roots. They desired opportunities for
themselves and their children but were prevented by the British who wanted to maintain
them as an exploitable class.
Although the failure of leadership in the Indian community was what led
scholars like Stenson, Kaur, and Ramasamy to conclude that there was no class alliance
or class consciousness among Indians, I argue that this did not mean that class alliance
and class consciousness was absent among the laborers. The Tamil laborers, always
suffered the same fate. They did not need leadership to tell them what their problems
were. They experienced it first hand. Poverty and hardship were difficult circumstances
that they encountered daily. These difficult circumstances created in them a
consciousness that they as a community were being intentional left in the backwaters by
colonial authorities and planters simply because they carried the baggage of subalternity
and could therefore be exploited by which ever dominant power that ruled over them.
The only way to overcome this pronouncement of inferiority was to resist colonial
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oppression. Only through resistance could a positive outcome be obtained for the
community as a whole.
Conditions Under which Indian Laborers Worked
What were some of these oppressive conditions that Indian laborers struggled
with? An excerpt from the British newspaper, The Observer, gives us an idea:
Several times I have been shown with pride coolie lines on plantations
that a kennelman in England would not tolerate for his hounds. There is
little or no personal relationship between employer and employee, and a
profound contempt (by the employers) for the trade union movement....
One continually hears counter-violence being advocated: 'It's all these
beggars understand.' There is little consciousness of the poverty and
illiteracy that exists in the country. And, too often it is a foul, degrading,
urine-tainted poverty, a thing of old grey rags and scraps of rice, made
tolerable only by the sun.74
Intolerable conditions such as that described above and the impoverishment suffered
during the war empowered workers to demand more for themselves from the colonial
power.
Indian workers were also bonded to the estates unlike the Chinese workers. As
such, managers when calculating wages took into account the “free” housing that was
given to these workers. In the event that the workers participated in strikes, they could be
easily dismissed and as a direct consequence of that, evicted. Amarjit Kaur's study on the
wage structure used on the estates reveal a policy of playing one race against another. She
quotes Palmer who wrote that
in prosperous times Chinese laborers' wages usually ranged well above
Indian and Javanese workers' wages. Planters justified this wage
74

“What the Malayan Trade Unionists Are Up Against,” Papers on Communist Party of Malaya including
Information on Malayan Independence Struggle and the Malayan National Strike, 1946-1947.
CP/CENT/INT/36/08 1946-1947, Labor History Archive and Study Center, People's History Museum,
Manchester, United Kingdom.

40
differential on the grounds that the Chinese were healthier and more
hardworking than the Indians and employment through contractors
meant that the planters could save on housing and other facilities.75
After the war, the size of the Malay population was recognized as another way to use race
for the purpose of quashing demands for higher wages and the breaking of strikes. This
discovery was, according to Stenson, another way of obtaining cheap labor without
having to improve on production methods.76 The imperial policy of playing one race
against the other helped in preventing collective bargaining and further ensured that
division along racial lines would stifle any sort of political unity that may occur, or so the
Colonial power thought. Although racial divisions and communal separatism triumphed
many times over racial unity, it should be noted that it only succeeded because the
colonial power constantly played its divide and rule trump card to create and maintain
division.
The value of Indian labor was also tied to the value of rubber. In his early critique
of capitalism, Marx spoke about the alienation of the human being from the product of
his labor. He said, “Labor becomes the slave of the object, since only through it can the
laborer continue to exist, not only as a worker, but as a human being.”77 Marx's
observation is clearly seen in Peter Winn's study of the Yarur factory workers in Chile.
The highly repressive Taylor System that was employed at the factory, mechanized
workers in their tasks. The system was set up in such a way that profit was its ultimate
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aim. It completely ignored the welfare of the workers and saw workers as nothing more
than an extension to the machines they were using to create the products. As such, it was
justified to pay the lowest wages possible while demanding the highest output from
workers, the management knowing fully well that the survival of the workers depended
on that wage, no matter how small. For every worker that protested and quit, there were
many others to replace him or her. The Taylor System was thus, “a capitalist dream but
workers' nightmare.”78 Contrasting the Taylor System with what the plantation system
was like, one obtains a somewhat similar scenario. The fluctuating price of rubber
controlled the wages of Indian laborers. It even controlled their ability to be employed as
colonial planters easily dismissed laborers when the demand for rubber was down.
Despite the horrid conditions under which the Yarur workers were employed, they
were still able to escape their work environment when they clocked out. They had a life
outside the factory walls that gave them freedom and fulfillment. The Indian plantation
laborers could not escape their work environment. They were bonded to the plantation.
To desert, or strike, or simply quit, was to lose the roof over one's head. Not only does the
laborer suffer the consequence of eviction, but his whole family as well. Workers also
constantly felt that they were under surveillance as “the bulk of the workers and their
bosses work(ed) and live(d) in the same environment.”79 Scholar Selvakumaran
Ramachandran described life on a typical rubber estate as being “highly disciplined” and
the daily work, “monotonous, repetitive and routine.”80 There was no escape from the
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feeling of drudgery and being weighed down. These conditions instilled in them a type of
discipline that Foucault observed as being necessary for the creation of docile bodies. He
claimed that, “The aim is to derive the maximum advantages and to neutralize the
inconveniences (thefts, interruptions of work, disturbances and 'cabals'), as the forces of
production become more concentrated; to protect materials and tools and to master the
labor force.”81
The level of surveillance became even more pronounced during the time of radical
unionism when Indian laborers were heavily influenced by the MCP. Stenson wrote that
laborers activities were carefully monitored by plantation managers who searched
laborers in the day to ensure that “they took no extra food to the field that might be
handed to the Communists.” Laborers were also “effectively locked in their lines” by
night to prevent them from meeting with anyone connected to the MCP.82 Control over
Indian laborers freedom was imperative in ensuring that the daily work on the rubber
plantation was carried out without any subversion.
Poor wages was the number one concern for Indian laborers. Because their wages
were tied to the demand for rubber, the Indian working class was unable to depend on a
steady income. Labor regulations prior to the war allowed for labor to be repatriated
during down times and increased during peak times. During the years of depression
between 1930 – 1933, “labor surplus was shipped back to India under the aegis of the
Tamil Immigration Fund,” thus avoiding labor unrest and reducing planters overheads.83
The costs of labor reproductions was thus borne by the South Indian villages. As Jomo
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Kwame Sundram noted, it was “subsistence peasant production which actually subsidized
the necessary costs of reproduction of labor required by capitalists.”84 After the war, labor
could not be repatriated so the colonial authorities had to ensure that wages were kept at a
minimum.
Amarjit Kaur, in her study of the plantation wage structure wrote that there were
three principal methods of payments – check-roll, task, and result. Wages were decided
not just based on job classification, but also along race and gender lines, resulting in the
Indians always getting the shorter end of the stick. Such divisions naturally contributed to
tensions between the Indians and Chinese. Planters justified the wage differential by
explaining that the Chinese were healthier and therefore better workers. Also, because
they eliminated planters' overheads by working under contractors who took care of their
housing and food. She explained that
The check-roll laborer was paid a fixed daily wage, providing a whole
day's work was completed. Under the task method of payment the worker
was assigned a certain amount of work (by law... no more than nine
hours) and paid according to the number of tasks completed …. In the
category payment by result, the tapper was also given a task but was paid
at so much per pound of dry rubber contained in the latex obtained from
the task. Generally, although Indians and Chinese worked on similar
tasks, the Indians were employed under the check-roll system, whether as
tappers or field workers. The Chinese were usually remunerated on the
payment by result method.85
This wage structure ensured that Indian laborers always received less than the Chinese
workers. Planters were anxious to continue this trend after the war but received much
opposition from Indians who demanded an increase in wages. More of them also chose to
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be employed as contract workers in order to receive wages on par with the Chinese. As
will be discussed in Chapter 4, this new situation was not at all appealing to the colonial
authorities and planters who were only interested in profit maximization.
Indian Consciousness and Agency
Amarjit Kaur and Michael Stenson have both written that the bonded and isolated
nature of the Indian workers on the estates created in them a consciousness that was both
“subservient and retarded,” which allowed for their exploitation by the British. In
contrast, the Chinese workers were aware of the value of their labor to the colonial
plantation structure and the economic implications on their wages. They were aware of
the lucrative rubber market and when it was doing well on the commodities market. As
such, they knew when to make demands for higher wages. However, a change in Indian
consciousness began to show in the late 1930s. Indians understood the crucial role they
played in the plantation capitalist structure as cheap labor, and wanted to change this
dynamics of exploitation. This was evident through intermittent strikes prior to the war
demanding increases in wages and other benefits. An example of this new consciousness
is seen in the call for Indian labor to unite against colonial capitalists reportedly made by
R.H. Nathan, a member of the editorial board of the Tamil Nesan, a leading Tamil
newspaper in Malaya in 1941:
A lot of coolies now understand what is the difference between laborers
and capitalists. Co-operation is our watchword. The estate proprietors
and agents will try to break this co-operation. But we cannot allow this to
interfere with our work. Unity is strength.86
Yet another example is seen in the remarks to Indian laborers by Y.K. Menon, a labor
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activist around the same time who said, “Before we organized this Union you all thought
that Capitalists were Gods and we were slaves. Now at least 25 percent of you realize
that this is not so. We are Indians and slaves to nobody.”87
After the war, similar remarks like those above were echoed by new leaders that
continued to show an understanding of the colonial exploitation that was going on and
how Indians figured in the whole labor – colonial capitalist relationship. An example of
this can be seen in the following statement by Budh Singh, the radical socialist leader of
the Malayan Indian Congress who had this to say just before the declaration of a State of
Emergency in June 1948:
.. the Congress is convinced that the root cause of the industrial unrest is
… in fact that the production relations between the vested interests and
the laboring forces is wholly out of keeping with the present economic
set-up of the country.[The root cause of the unrest] is in the distribution
of … wealth. Somebody is taking too much leaving an inadequate
residue for the laboring many.88
Indian laborers were also very familiar with a hierarchical plantation structure that
placed white planters and fellow English educated Indians above them. In this structure,
the Tamil laborer saw no opportunity for himself or his family for upward mobility. In
contrast, his Ceylonese (from Jaffna in Sri Lanka) and Malayalee (from Kerala in India)
countrymen, obtained supervisory jobs from the British by virtue of their missionary
school education in India. The British favored them. Their elevated status enabled them
to ensure that their children obtained better education in English schools, compared to
Tamil children on the plantation who received mediocre education. E.T. Thompson
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described the power structure on the plantation as “.. having the characteristics of a small
state with a classification of people into different statuses together with a formal
definition of the relationship between them.”89
Amarjit Kaur's description of a “retarded consciousness” among the Tamil
laborers can therefore be attributed to this organization of placing the most marginalized
of people at the bottom and not giving them any recognition, placing any value, or having
any expectations of them beyond the menial tasks that they were required to perform.
However, in his critique of false consciousness which is similar to Kaur's description of
'retarded consciousness,' James Scott argued that history has many examples in which
subordinate classes have been “at the base … of revolutionary movements … seeking
goals well within their understanding of the ruling ideology.” Scott asserted, “Falsely
conscious subjects are quite capable, it seems of taking revolutionary action.”90
Therefore, Amarjit Kaur is wrong to assume that there was no class
consciousness or class alliance in the rubber plantation industry. The Indian working class
was conscious of how important they were in the colonial plantation structure and wanted
change. They refused to be exploited. While they were willing to remain in the confines
of the plantation structure, they were unwilling to take the meager allowances that the
British were giving them. They demanded more.
The period after the war was a time of discovery of agency. The war only
strengthened this new awareness especially since it removed the veil of British
dominance. Not much recognition is given to specifically Indian agency during this time
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period because of the briefness in its display and the subsequent counter through
draconian measures. Colonial intervention in the form of the declaration of the
Emergency clamped down on the challenge Indian laborers made against the British.
Their end pursuit for better wages and a generally better quality of life, was denied.
Nevertheless it was a significant time. Significant because dominance was threatened and
the threat came from a usually subservient group of people. The usual order did not
matter. James Scott says,
Hidden transcripts can occasionally be openly declared in the face of
power. When suddenly subservience evaporates and is replaced by
open defiance we encounter one of those rare and dangerous moments
in power relations.91
It was therefore involvement in the trade union movement, encouraged by the
MCP, that gave these people hope and they used the only effective weapon they knew and
could use against the colonial power. That was the strike weapon. In this way they
showed their agency. The failure in leadership compounded with the imperial agenda of
subversion based on a smear campaign of the MCP and trade unionism, was what
ultimately drove the movement among the Indian masses aground.
The first step in repressing unionism was to split up the 300,000 strong Pan
Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU), formerly known as the General Labor
Unions(GLUs). Special Trade Union Advisers were sent in to do this and the mode
applied was to split the unions up along racial lines – Malays, Indians and Chinese. An
article written by an unknown source from the Labour History Archive and Study
Center in The People's History Museum stated:
Though the propaganda in this country has maintained that the Unions
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were repressed because they were “not real unions,” and that they were
“Communist organizations” and that they were guilty of “terrorism” – the
official Government reason given for the repression on June 13th was that
the PMFTU was not registered. Under the Malayan law all Trade Unions
must be registered and they are only legally entitled to do so if they are
Unions catering for workers of the same race. Unions affiliated to the
PMFTU duly registered. But the PMFTU, being a Federation, couldn’t
and didn't – any more than the TUC registered in Britain. For that “crime”
it was outlawed, its leaders arrested, shot or driven into the jungle.92
Stenson writes that “by 1949, the number of registered unionists was down to 41,
305 or about one-fifth the level of 1947.”93 The only unions that eventually survived were
the colonial sanctioned ones under the auspices of John Brazier, the Trade Union Adviser
from Britain, and those approved by the Registrar of Trade Unions in the period before
June 1948.
Official colonial records downplay the emancipation movement by workers
through strikes but interestingly it is also official records through its disclosure of the
difficulties faced by the Colonial power during the Emergency period and the request for
arms and military support, that also belie the fact that perhaps the movement was not so
insignificant. The very fact that the “Emergency” was issued to counter the MCP
influence is an indication by itself that the post-war period was indeed one of major
resistance and the atmosphere, one of liberation with a willingness of its participants to
fight for it till the end. While the colonial authorities attributed violence during this time
to the actions of the MCP, labor documents question this assertion. There was a lack of
consensus between colonial authorities themselves on how much influence the MCP had
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on trade unions. The following is an excerpt from an article written by an unknown
source from the Labor History and Archive Center at the People's History Museum:
There is no evidence to show any connection between the killings in
Malaya and the PMFTU. In fact, the Government itself has produced no
evidence – and never even accused the PMFTU of this crime …. The
Government can't even make up its mind on this question. Creech Jones
[The Colonial Secretary], in the House, said that the Communists had taken
up arms because they failed to gain any support in the Trade Unions. If that
is so, why were the Trade Unions banned? On the other hand, Malcom
MacDonald[High Commissioner] says the unions were banned because
they were dominated by communists.94
Violence was the order of the day once British authorities started clamping down
on what they termed as subversive activities. More militant MCP members took to arms
and were responsible for a number of killings of planters and officials. However, British
forces were equally responsible for deaths of union leaders and workers who continued to
resist. This was noted by Budh Singh, the Chairman of the Malayan Indian Congress in
his following remarks before the declaration of the State of Emergency in June 1948:
Congress contends that violence today in the economic field is not from
the workers side alone. There is a good deal of violence of a subtle and
corrosive nature from the side of vested interests. Witness the latest piece
of Federal legislation for trade unions in the country. A deliberate coldblooded attempt on the part of the vested interests working in collusion
with the Government to deny labor the right of a united labor front to
strengthen the cause of labor. Congress is aware that on the one hand
workers, in the frenzy of desperation, driven to the furthest wall by the
force of economic destitution, have resorted to sticks and stones and
other puny missiles to wreak their anger on those whom they believe are
the cause of their poverty. Congress is also aware on the other hand the
vested interests moving in close association with Government are
indulging in cold-blooded violence disguised under the innocent and
legal form of bills and ordinances to repress and coerce labor ....
Government has therefore decided for itself that a solution can be found
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in a brutal and merciless exploitation of the police forces in the country,
aided no doubt by the military to maintain law and order.95
Official documents representing the public transcript have poorly represented the
struggles of labor in Malaya post-World War II. As the official representation of “truth,”
the public transcript denies the actors of that time any agency. Instead it presents them
i.e. the Indian and Chinese working class as a people influenced by Communists and not
as a people fighting for their rights against an imperial capitalist domination. As James
Scott said:
The “official transcript” as a social fact presents enormous difficulties for
the conduct of historical and contemporary research on subordinate
groups. Short of actual rebellion, the great bulk of public events, and
hence the great bulk of the archives, is consecrated to the official
transcript. And on those occasions when subordinate groups do put in an
appearance, their presence, motives, and behavior are mediated by the
interpretation of dominant elites. When the subordinate group is almost
entirely illiterate the problem is compounded.96
Chapter 4 looks at the colonial mindset upon its return to Malaya after the war.
The colonial power's intent to get the stalled rubber industry up and running again is
obvious in the way Indian workers were “rounded up.” The number of strikes that took
place in 1947 indicate strong working class organization. The most significant part of the
next chapter is an analysis of the creation and influence of the AMRWC.
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CHAPTER 4
WORKING CLASS ORGANIZATION THROUGH
STRIKES AND UNIONISM
World War II severely drained Malayans of their resources. With a food shortage
after the war, Indian laborers and others in Malaya suffered miserable conditions.
Colonial interests were of course to regroup as many laborers as possible to work again.
A report on the labor situation after the war written in 1945 by the Labor Office indicates
that destitute laborers, particularly Indian Tamils, were found all over the place after the
departure of the Japanese, more prominently in the larger cities where they would beg for
money and food. The report while stating the condition of these people, also stresses the
immediate needs of the Empire to obtain as many fit laborers as possible:
The last week has been spent in tracing and collecting together in
various camps as many unemployed and destitute laborers as could be
found in and around the town. Most of these laborers are undernourished and many of them are ill, some being affected with dangerous
infections and contagious diseases. Priority has, in the circumstance,
been given to the transfer of all dangerous cases to hospitals in order to
prevent the outbreak of a serious epidemic in this town [Kuala Lumpur].
The next consideration has been the restoration to health of the
remaining laborers, so that they may be fit to work again as early as
possible.97
This emphasis to get laborers in working condition comes up again in a situational report
in October, 1945 from the Labor Department. It states:
Already, therefore, we have begun to achieve one of the final objects in
regard to labor – getting the unfit on their feet again and earning. A
sustained effort has been made to get work started on rubber estates once
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more, but it has been very much like climbing a steep and slippery
slope.98
The above statement portrays a complete disregard for the workers humanity and is an
indication of what the colonial mindset was towards these Indian laborers. They were
nothing more that tools of production. Colonial officials noted the state of destitution of
Indian laborers in many documents written in 1945 and the general consensus of the day
was that the Indian Tamils and the Javanese workers from Indonesia were the most sickly
and unfit of all the races after the war. A Labor Report for 1945 commented that,
the Chinese seem to have been well able to look after themselves
and stand on their own feet to-day. There are batches of
unemployed, but they are not destitute or unfit to anything like
the extent that the Tamils and Javanese are.99
It was this recognition of the state of destitution in the Indian laborer that made it
easier for British planters and officials to agree on lower wages for they knew the
desperate state of these laborers. They understood quite well that for those destitute
laborers, earning something was better than earning nothing. They underestimated the
influence of the unions and the MCP on the laborers. Of greater significance was the
laborers' own discontent with everything. The combination of these factors eventually led
Indian laborers to go on strikes, bringing the industries they were involved in to a virtual
standstill on many occasions. E.P. Thompson, a foremost historian on the British
working class, said that no account of labor unrest could be fully understood without
taking into account “the total life experience, the manifold satisfactions or deprivations,
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cultural as well as material, of the people concerned.”100 The period after the war was
indeed one of deprivation and destitution in Malaya but a state the colonial government
refused to recognize and address properly, leading the people to revolt using the only
weapon they had at their disposal, the strike.
1946, 1947, and 1948 were therefore years filled with strikes and protests, more
often violent that not, from laborers who were trying to recover from war conditions.
Indian, as well as Chinese laborers felt that they needed to demand highers wages to meet
the high costs of living and especially staples like rice. The British knew that these
frustrations were eventually going to boil over. A situational report written to the Chief
Secretary of the BMA from the Labor Department in October 1945 states that
the urgent need at the moment remains, as stated …. the fixation of the
price of rice at a reasonably low figure. Labor will not continue to work
much longer under existing wages and prices.101
Although some among the colonial authorities recognized this, laborers' demands were
mostly met with antagonism from the majority of the planters and colonial authorities.
The Annual Report for the Labor Department in the year 1947 by R.G.D. Houghton, the
Colonial Labor Secretary, dismisses the workers' grievances as their inability to
understand the workings of economics. He states:
Most of the commodities produced in Malaya were in acute demand as a
result of shortages accruing during the war. In addition, wage rates in
some industries were too low. In other instances, they were
uneconomically high because the law of supply and demand had been
allowed to rein at a time of labor shortage and intense demand.
Adjustment of wage rates in such circumstances is always difficult and it
was more so in Malaya owing to the inability of the workers or their
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trade unions to appreciate that it was not to their ultimate advantage to
maintain uneconomically high wage rates or to pursue the mirage of
increased wages for less output.102
This comes in the same year when the Labor Department in a report on Trade
Unionism in Malaya stated that the European employers in the tin and rubber industries
had returned to Malaya after the Japanese Occupation with one thing in mind and that
was to “assist the United Kingdom in securing [a] dollar exchange,” and getting the
“industries … back to full production as quickly as possible .. to secure dividends for
their shareholders.”103 Yet, the onus was put on struggling laborers to understand the
workings of economics and not the shareholders, who expected their dividends
regardless of the state of poverty and destitution in post-war Malaya.
This was a crucial time for Indian laborers. They had understood the capitalist
agenda. The war had also changed the way they perceived the colonial power. They had
developed a spirit of defiance and were not afraid to confront the authorities with their
demands. They took on a nature quite contrary to their perceived docile demeanor. This
new demeanor was surprising to planters and officials who were previously
accustomed to the patriarchal atmosphere of pre-war estates, [and]
expected as a matter of routine to cope with the day to day problems of
their laborers, financial and domestic, and who had difficulty in adjusting
themselves to the post-war spirit of independence.104
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All Malayan Rubber Workers Council (AMRWC)
Amidst the numerous strikes organized by different groups, one in particular
stood out. The August 25, 1947 Malayan wide strike organized by the All Malayan
Rubber Workers Council (AMRWC). This organization was a fairly young
predominantly Indian trade union that was established on June 6, 1947. It was headed by
S.V. K. Moorthi, the President of the Selangor Estate Workers Trade Union (SEWTU), an
organization that represented 240 estates. Initially, its main task was to demand a 100%
wage increase for Indian laborers. Had the demand been successful its concession would
have applied throughout the Malayan Union.105
The AMRWC came into being when meetings held between the United Planters
Association of Malaya (UPAM) and the Central Committee of the SEWTU collapsed.
The UPAM was an organization representing mostly European planters. The UPAM
agreed to all of the SEWTU's demands except the 100% increase in wage rates for Indian
estate workers.106 UPAM's denial of the 100% increase in wages for Indian laborers
became the first cause that the AMRWC took up on its inception. Its second aim was to
oppose the 20% cut in contract tapping rates imposed by the UPAM, which would have
mainly affected the Chinese estate laborers. By combining these two causes, the
AMRWC projected itself as an organization that cut across racial barriers and fought for
the rights of all workers. Eventually, the AWRWC succeeded in forcing the hand of the
UPAM to concede to the re-establishment of the 20% contract wage rates.
By mobilizing all estate laborers to participate in a one day General Strike on the
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25 of August, 1947, this young organization exerted pressure on the UPAM to concede to
its demands. The agency of the Indian workers in particular comes out through this strike
and although the effectiveness of the strike is eventually down played in the colonial
documents, it is also some of these documents that give important recognition to the
beginning of agency among the Indian working class, and further, how it was only
expected to grow.
The dismissal of the Malayan Union by the British was empowering to
organizations like the UPAM. While the failure of the proposed Malayan Union
constitution was a tremendous blow to the working class in Malaya, it emboldened
colonial sanctioned businesses. These businesses that owned plantations felt that they
could dictate the conditions governing workers and the latter would have no choice but to
adhere. The brazen behavior of the colonial power in completely dismissing the demands
of the Chinese and Indians passed on to the planters as well. Planters took the opportunity
to find ways to further reduce wages of workers. On June 7, 1947 planters denied the
demands for a 100% increase in wage rates for all Indian estate workers. In the same
month, the UPAM suggested that wages would have to be “reviewed because of the fall
in the price of rubber” and recommended “a 20% wage cut be imposed on the tapping
rates of contract workers.” 107
Trade unions affiliated with the strong communist influenced Pan Malayan
General Labor Union (PMGLU) however, were “convinced that the UPAM's decision
was motivated less by the fall in the rubber price than the calculated attempt to reduce the
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wages of Chinese labor to the level of Indian labor.”108 This was a very real suspicion on
the part of the trade unions as the Labor Report for June, 1947 when addressing this 20%
wage cut in contract tapping rates by the UPAM admits,
... the paradoxical position of negotiations going on on the one hand, to
consider a demand for a 100% increase in time work rates which would
mainly affect Indian estate workers, while on the other employers were
imposing a 20% cut in contract tapping rates, which would affect namely
Chinese labor, therefore, opening UPAM up to accusations of using this
retrograde method of narrowing the gap between Indian and Chinese
earnings, instead of increasing the rates of pay to Indian laborers.109
Unions accused the UPAM of making this decision out of its own “selfish determination
and self-preservation,” while ignoring the plight of the workers who had to deal with the
rising cost of living. In a letter written by The Union of Rubber Employees to the
Malayan Union Secretariat in July, union leaders stated that even the “government
authorities admitted that the standard of living for June had averagely become higher,”
therefore making “the wages earned by the workers prior to June …. hardly .. enough to
upkeep their living.”110 The letter further denounced the Government for avoiding any
kind of involvement in settling the dispute between the workers and UPAM, stating that
they were surprised and disappointed that the “Labor Commissioner [who has] the legal
authority to settle labor disputes said that he has no power to do so.”111
The AMRWC, acting as a representative for all laborers, consistently wrote to the
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UPAM and the Malayan Union Secretariat with its demands, warning that the matter
could take a serious turn. At every juncture it assumed a more aggressive tone, unafraid
of consequences and willing to challenge the UPAM. The Labor Department Report for
July 1947 acknowledges that the AMRWC appealed to the Government “to discuss both
the 20% cut and the former demand for a 100 % increase in time work wages,”
threatening that “100,000 estate workers may be forced to take active steps to defend
their interests.”112 It urged UPAM “to convene a round table conference of UPAM and
AMRWC,” or otherwise, to jointly appeal “to the Malayan Union Government in calling
for a Tripartite Conference (Representatives of Government, Employers and
Employees) ... to carry out timely negotiations in settling the .... matters amicably.”113
Another letter sent to the Governor of the Malayan Union indicated that the high costs of
living incurred by the Indian workers was the main reason for demanding a 100%
increase in wages. It stated that the increase in prices of essential commodities presented
major problems to the Indian workers who could not afford these prices.
As such, if no further steps were taken to solve these disputes amicably
then undoubtedly Malayan-wide strikes, which are direct result of
unbearable conditions of workers, would be unavoidable.114
Further, on the issue of the 20% wage cut on contract labor, the union accused UPAM of
“[threatening] defenseless workers with unemployment and [driving] them to the
borderline of starvation,” if workers disputed this cut.115
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They questioned its authority saying, “if you have not the authority for the
formation of a machine of negotiation, then what machine do you have for the
declaration?” The union pressed on, describing the UPAM as “a machine of contradiction
and confusion.” 116 Receiving no positive response for negotiations from either the
UPAM or the Malayan Union Secretariat, on August 22 the AMRWC declared they had
no other option but to carry out their threats. In its second meeting, AMRWC members
agreed to use “the only weapon in the armory ….. and call for a General Protest Strike on
the 25 of August, 1947 for the duration of one day.”117
Breaking with the past Chinese workers supported the AWRWC, indicating a
working-class solidarity. Previously the Chinese were always more militant in their
demands and the Indians less vocal. That pattern would change in the post-war period.
Indians had also discovered their voice. Although Michael Stenson acknowledges that
“Indian laborers were more militant than Chinese throughout 1947,” he goes on to claim
that Indians received little Chinese support and were “unwilling to strike in solidarity
with the Indians when this would prejudice their own living standards.”118 This thesis
proves otherwise. Colonial documents on labor from the National Archives in Kuala
Lumpur show this solidarity. Before the war, each community functioned separately.
However, both communities now realized that they had to stick together in order to stand
up to colonial authority. This was an important development and something the colonial
power had tried very hard to prevent all those years before.
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After the one day strike on August 25, a letter sent from the all Chinese Batu
Pahat District Rubber Workers Association to the Governor of the Malayan Union, said
to represent the views of “2200 odd male and female laborers” under its jurisdiction, had
this to say:
On the 25 of August, the laborers went on a one day strike as a protest
against the UPAM, They have been forced to do so. The main point is the
maladministration of the UPAM. The latter did not take into consideration
of the livelihood of the laborers. In all Labor Dispute Negotiation
meetings, the laborers have pointed out the inability of the laborers' to
meet even the minimum cost of living. The UPAM did only look after
their own pockets, and knew nothing of present day conditions. They
should be held responsible for the strike. It is hoped that H.E. will
earnestly comprehend the miseries of the laborers for the sake of the
benefits of capital-labor co-operation, social peace, and the prosperity of
Malaya, and urge the UPAM to expedite negotiation with the Malayan
Rubber Workers Council, and to guarantee the livelihood of the laborers.
We once more repeat that the protest against the unreasonable 20% wage
reduction and support for the 100% increase in wages asked for by the
Indian workers are rational.119
This letter clearly represented the views expressed by Chinese workers regarding
the UPAM's unfair decision on wages, but its main importance lies in the support it
showed for the Indians. The Indians and Chinese had developed a like minded attitude in
supporting each other's cause.
On August 26, a day after the strike, the Malayan Union Secretariat informed the
AMRWC “that as a result of the unanimous advise of the Labor Advisory Board to His
Excellency the Governor, a draft Wages Council Bill is being prepared.” This was with
the intention of introducing “a democratic method of fixing wage levels which retain all
the chief elements of collective bargaining yet has the advantage of requiring that the
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minimum rate fixed shall be enforced by law.” 120 Although this merely passed the buck
on to the new Wages Council Bill, colonial officials acknowledged that the AMRWC'
efforts worked. This acknowledgment was significant in determining Indian agency. The
colonial authorities felt the pressure from the AMRWC and the Indian laborers, leading
them to write in the Labor Report for 1947:
One thing seems very clear – given only a good cause – the
organizers will be able to call out practically the whole industry
pretty rapidly. Their control is more effective than was generally
realized.121
Once the effectiveness of trade unionism started to show itself, a decision was taken by
colonial authorities to clamp down on it.
According to political scientist P. Ramasamy, the August 25 nation-wide strike
was effective in most parts of the country. In some states it led to 90 – 95% closure of
estates while in others, about 50 – 75% closure of estates.122 The Labor Department's
report on trade unionism released in September of that year estimated that the day's strike
led to “a stoppage of approximately 70% of the European owned section of the
industry.”123
Ramasamy also wrote that the AMRWC was successful in organizing strikes but
unsuccessful in obtaining wage increases. However, Labor Department reports from
1947 reveal contrary information. These reports provide evidence that the 20% cut in
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contract wages was overturned and wages were restored. Although the AMRWC' efforts
appear to have helped the Chinese only, information from the Labor Department also
indicates that by this time, an increasing number of Indians were also engaged in contract
work, and benefited from this wage restoration. Indian laborers, struggling to make ends
meet, increasingly wanted to be paid contract tapping rates like the Chinese laborers. The
November labor report in 1947 noted, “.. the increasing tendency for estates to employ
Indian tappers on contract rates.”124 The combined pressure from an increasing number of
Indians and Chinese engaged in contract work, would have worried the UPAM and
forced its hand into conceding. Even so, these concessions were given slowly and in parts
as planters and colonial authorities attempted to maintain control over the situation.
The Labor Department report for November 1947 states that employers relented
and offered an initial 5% restoration of wages early in the month of November. This was
after indication from the UPAM that “there was a chance of the complete restoration of
the 20% cut in contract tapping rates imposed in July.” The report goes on to say that
laborers were disappointed when only a further 5% was restored in the middle of the
month. This led the union to adopt “a smug attitude” and make “pointed remarks
regarding the generosity of the employers.” However, employee-employer relations
improved when “employers issued a notice on the 28th of the month that the full cut of
20% would be restored as from the 1st of the month [November].”125
Employers giving in to the union's demands in order to restore stability is evident
in the Labor Report for December 1947, where it is stated that “... the complete
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restoration of the 20% cut in contract tapping rates which was granted in November had a
steadying effect on labor.” 126 This was affirmed again in the Annual Report of the Labor
Department for the year 1947 by R.G.D. Houghton, the Commissioner of Labor himself.
Although his report downplays the significance of the August 25 strike and those other
strikes, and gives the impression that labor was not at all unhappy and that in fact, “there
was a definite improvement in employee-employer relations in spite of the reduction
made,” he admits to the 20% wage restoration and credits it to the employers.127 His
statement that “workers were impressed by the initiative which had been shown by the
employers,” however, is clearly meant to diminish any role that a collective working
force or the AMRWC played in obtaining that restoration.
Here, the employers set the tone of the public transcript making themselves look
good. Anything positive had to appear as if it came from the benevolence of the colonial
authorities and not through the demands of the workers. The colonial authority attempted
to control the narrative. At the same time though, they acknowledge the agency of Indian
laborers. The colonial power now recognized that there was an awakening in the Indian
laborer. The Tamil laborer was no longer passive. He was not going to blindly follow the
dictates of those who ruled over him. He questioned those dictates and resisted if they
were contrary to what he desired. This colonial recognition of Indian agency comes
through in the following labor report in September, 1947:
The Indian agricultural worker has been used to control by domination
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from above. In India and prior to the war in Malaya, he was quite
prepared to accept the dictates of the panchayat of his village or estate,
despite the fact that he had no say in its election. It saved him the trouble
of thinking for himself. It seems that his awakening and willingness to
take responsibility will be slow in developing but there is no doubt that
it is taking place.128
This recognition of the beginning of agency amongst a formerly docile and easily

manipulated community put fear in the hearts of colonists. They were used to the
militancy among Chinese workers but not the Indians. The race card always gave them
the ability to use the latter to keep the former in check. The Dalley/Awberry Report on
labor and trade unionism, commissioned by the Secretary of State for the Colonies in
1948 was clear in stating that the Indians outnumbered all races on the estates.129 This
report was written with the intention of looking thoroughly at the situation of labor and
trade unions in Malaya. Recommendations made in this report were given the highest
consideration by colonial authorities. If this report recognized Indians as a formidable
force on the plantations, how could the colonial power then allow these laborers to
become more aggressive in their demands? Something needed to be done.
The Indians' new militancy, albeit in its infancy, compounded by working-class
racial unity, was going to be crippling to the colonial capitalist enterprise, and the British
knew it. Hence, its harsh draconian response in suppressing the power and influence of
“leftist” trade unions and declaring a period of Emergency in 1948, the very next year
after the victory of the AMRWC and a collective racial working-class.
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By this, the display of agency by the Indians was quickly subverted. It was a
victory for the AMRWC and the Indians but the colonial power was not going to give
them that recognition, which may have legitimized their position. The number of working
days lost (see Table 1) illustrates the Indian workers' growing power. The statistics
available for the month of August however would have been much higher had the labor
report for that month taken into account the one day strike on August 25, but it was not
included. According to the Labor Department accurate figures were not available.

Table 1 - The number of days lost to strikes on estates in Malaya for the second half of the

year in 1947.130
Month

Number of Disputes Number of
workmen involved
in all stoppages in
progress during
the month

Aggregate number
of working days
lost in all stoppages
in progress during
the month

Jun

15

1712

13601

July

46

6538

63071

August

36

5520

72973

September

22

5969

70150

October

12

2927

12143

November

26

3318

18831

December

14

2019

25140
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Colonial Subversion of Indian Agency
When the British declared a state of emergency in Malaya in June 1948, they were
projecting their dominance and authority by defining who was a terrorist and who was
not. The Emergency period in Malaya was bloody and lasted until 1960, by far the
longest state of emergency in any British colony. Left wing unions were denied
registration. Leaders were arrested, even killed. More militant trade union leaders fled to
the jungle to wage an armed struggle against the British. Colonial forces pursued and
killed these militants. The declaration of the Emergency was an indication of refusal on
the part of the imperial power to recognize post-war struggles for independence and
freedom from the shackles of colonialism. Sociologist Frank Furedi defines this state of
emergency as confusing times. He said that,
these conflicts were either actually or potentially colonial wars. The term
emergency was essentially a public relations concept. It had the advantage
of allowing Britain to adopt wide-ranging coercive powers while
maintaining the pretense of normal civil rule. Above all, emergencies
helped create the impression that the issue at stake was that of law and
order rather than a political challenge to colonialism. An emergency was
called to restore order – by definition it aimed to curb those who caused
disorder. Emergency measures allowed colonial governors to label their
opponents as law breakers. At a stroke anti-colonial activists could be
transformed into criminals or terrorists.131
Conventional wisdom will say that a combination of factors such as the rise of left-

wing trade unionism, a destruction of civil order through trade union activity, and the
involvement of the Malayan Communist Party in trade unions, was what led to the
creation of the Emergency period. A better explanation will include the inability of the
colonial power to control the working class. No recognition is given to this because of
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the way the public transcript has been presented by the colonial power. The masses had
discovered their voice and their strength, not just within their own communities, but the
strength of a combined racial unity. The trade unions were just a means to carry our their
purpose. Just as the British industrial manufacturers saw “themselves as Hercules and the
industrial workers who challenged their authority as the hydra,” so did the British
colonizers in Malaya see themselves as a power that needed to destroy a combined force
of peasantry that rose up to challenge their colonial interests.132 The Malayan working
class struggle was a threat to British dominance.
As early as 1946, the UPAM was determined to curb left-wing unions. According
to Michael Stenson, “The numerous strikes and labor agitations that year was simply
interpreted as the work of agent provocateurs.” They suggested the following measures:
.. the non-recognition of the Federal Trade Unions, the application of the
Secret Societies Ordinance to all unregistered groups, the banishment of
subversive elements, strengthening of police power, the use of the
military when necessary and the introduction of an arbitration
mechanism.133
Trade unionism was the bane of British interests and the MCP was blamed for
using trade unions to get their agenda across. The Emergency period was used to get rid
of these “subversive elements” and replace them with compliant and conservative trade
unions. In 1947, the colonial authorities claimed that over 70% of trade unions in
Malaya were under the influence of political parties with a Communist agenda. The
usually pliant Indian workers were seen as being taken advantage of by these Chinese
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communists, who as the British claimed
have been clever enough to see how useful the Indian, who is a British
subject, can be for their purposes. They can use the Indian vernacular
press to further their views in this country and in India, and with the
advent of India's independence, they can make the old story of
imperialism and its link with capitalism seem more real and true than
ever.134
Imperial authorities could not believe that Indian workers wanted peace, justice,
order, and decent wages. They could not understand that Indians might have felt
empowered by India's nationalist struggles and their service in the Indian National Army
and Indian Independence League, during the war years. The British agreed that the
nationalist movement in India had an effect on the Indian workers but only in so far as
raising a consciousness that “he was an Indian and that India was aiming at full
independence and the exercise of sovereign rights.”135 Apart from that, the worker did not
fully “understand” the struggle for freedom from colonial exploitation. This
consciousness was however sufficient for workers to draw a parallel between colonial
control and capitalism, and how Indian workers figured in this relationship. They
understood that their labor was being appropriated for the benefit of the empire. They
understood that they were not going to gain anything but a continued life of misery,
unless they fought back. They connected this day-to-day through the humiliation and
poverty they suffered in the hands of the colonial planters and administrators. They
understood what it meant to be appropriated by a colonial regime for as Scott said:
Appropriation is ..... the purpose of domination. The very process of
appropriation however, unavoidably entails systematic social relations of
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subordination that impose indignities of one kind or another on the weak.
These indignities are the seedbed of the anger, indignation, frustration,
and swallowed bile that nurtures the hidden transcript …. Resistance,
then, originates not simply from material appropriation but from the
pattern of personal humiliations that characterize that exploitation.136
It was this consciousness that moved Indian laborers to get involved in trade
unions. It was a last resort on the part of the collective working class as the British
refused to listen to their grievances. Only the MCP was willing to listen. Therefore, the
working class consciously allowed the MCP influence over them. For the colonial power
to say that these external elements took advantage of the working class, or mere
uneducated laborers, is again to say that these people had no ability to think for
themselves, therefore denying them any agency. They did have agency and they knew
fully well the repercussions for exercising their rights. The Tribune political writer, S.
Raja Ratnam, in his critique of the Dalley/Awbery Report said that communist influence
on trade unions was inevitable as workers
receiving no sympathy from either the Government or the employers …
turned to the Communists for leadership – and the Communists gave it.
They acquired some reputation as the 'true' champions of the working
class. The main purpose of the Communists was to embarrass the
'imperialist-capitalist' government. They did this by making impossible
demands – 'impossible' from the point of view of the employers but not
necessarily from the workers …. which made them [the Communists],
appear as real champions of the workers.137
The Dalley/Awbery Report commissioned by the colonial government was a way
to whitewash the real problems in Malaya in the post-war period. It was of course, meant
to set the path for conservative unionism and it succeeded in getting that done. S.S.
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Awbery, Labour M.P. and also an official of the Transport and General Workers' Union,
and F. W. Dalley, an ex-assistant general secretary of the Railway Clerks' Association
spent eight weeks in Malaya beginning February 1948, with the purpose of looking
thoroughly at the labor situation and trade unions in Malaya. Being appointed by the
government, it was not surprising that they would have concluded their report by saying
that the colonial government gave every effort and encouragement in the period after the
war “for the exercise of freedoms of a democratic country – including freedom of speech,
Press, and association, while preserving law and order.” Further, “..... that due regard was
paid to the aspirations of the people of Malaya and the progressive policy of His
Majesty's Government.”
With regard to trade unions, the report stated that, “Particular encouragement was
given to the formation of responsible democratic Trade Unions, and as a special help in
this connection a Trade Union Adviser's Department was established,” but that the MCP
“... however continued with their post-war plans” by setting up “'cells,' dubbed Trade
Unions, for every type of trade and worker – from miners and rubber workers to cabaret
girls. None of these was in the smallest degree representative or democratic.”138 The
conservative press in the United Kingdom when writing on the Dalley/Awbery report,
chose to highlight facts such as those above.139
Communist influenced press and propaganda however chose to focus on the labor
struggles mentioned in the report. On the causes of the Malayan people's upsurge against
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imperial rule, the report blamed high prices of essentials and low wages, and
recommended how industrial grievances should be handled. The Daily Worker
countered,“Although their report makes admission of the appalling conditions in Malaya,
they do their best to whitewash the Government's terror campaign against the people.”140
The crux of the matter was that the report neglected to focus on the workers'
economic rights. Indeed Communists had a stronghold on the trade unions because they
were providing leadership to the workers, and encouraged them to voice their grievances.
The workers wanted democratic leadership and they were being deprived of it by the
government and the planters, who much preferred the pre-war paternalistic way of doing
things. The Standard in an article on July 10, 1948 summarized it well by saying that
the paternalistic system, however gratifying it may be for the ego of an
employer, is today considered an affront to his ego by the worker who is
moved by a new sense of his dignity. The worker is no longer content to
depend on the generosity of his employer. He thinks in terms of
economic rights.141
The article continued to say that employee-employer conflict was necessary, and
unavoidable, “but well organized trade unions and employers' associations are effective
guarantees that such a conflict does not descend into the anarchy of class war.” However,
this was precisely what was happening in Malaya at this time. Entrenching the Indian
working class in their menial tasks and not allowing them true democratic representation
was to ensure a destruction of their future and those of their children. Eventually, with no
real union to support and protect their interests, they lost their 'agricultural stronghold.'
Coming into power at independence, the Malayan government that was propped up by
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the British, continued the policies of the British, and neglected these Indian laborers,
leaving them to a worse state of destitution.
In his well written critique of the Awbery/Dalley Report, journalist S. Raja
Ratnam, aptly pointed out some of the more salient points that the report seemed to have
missed. Labor struggles in Malaya was in a setting of colonial rule, something that the
authors overlooked. It was not in a free, democratic, developed nation such as Britain.
Where labor had taken a long time to establish itself and create a unionism with a
democratic flavor, Malayan workers were trying to do in a few years while contending
with a legacy of colonial culture. That they achieved what they did was something to be
applauded, albeit under communist influence. The fact remained though, that if the
colonial government had given them the proper recognition and means to establish truly
democratic unionism, communist subversion may have been prevented.
The authors description of the workers also largely treats them as migrants. The
grave error of the British when abandoning the Malayan Union constitution is repeated
here. The political, social and economic climate was no longer the same as when Indians
were brought to Malaya by the British, or when the Chinese came as free laborers. In the
minds of the British, this was still a country with a people under colonial rule. In the
minds of the working class, the terms had changed. These were people who had already
decided to make Malaya their home. They wanted more than a mere wage. They wanted
a future. If the basic things that they were demanding were not being addressed, then
what hope was there for a better future? As S. Raja Ratnam reflected,
The labor problem must be studied in a situation which is a continual
flux – a situation burdened with a heavy heritage of past neglect and
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unresolved grievances. The labor situation must not be described as
though it is divorced from the economic, social, and political
environment …. [Authors have failed to appreciate] the way in which
Malaya's labor problems influence and are influenced by the
environment in which they operate.142
The important thing about colonial rule in Malaya was that it failed to prepare the
Malayan people for a future that was good, especially the former migrant races. Of the
two migrant races, the Indians would be the ones worse off. The short term capitalist
interests were always foremost in the minds of the British planters and officials. The
colonial power knew that it would not be able to control the colony for much longer as
costs mounted in maintaining its hold in Malaya and fighting the “reds,” so the focus was
to get as much out of Malaya as it could. Concentrating labor in the extraction of
resources ensured the under development of the country. Charles Gamba, an economist in
the 1950s, wrote:
The fact that virtually the entire production of raw materials is exported
offers an indication that the industrial development of the country is
relatively low. Furthermore, the high degree of dependency on rubber, tin,
and coconut – as exports – exposes Malaya to violent fluctuations in
external demand and prices; fluctuations almost entirely outside Malaya's
control and having the severest repercussions on the national income and,
thus, on the labor body – wages and salary earners – of the country.143
Gamba complained that Government was not interested in a more effective
control over the economic life of the colony, giving preference instead to the interests of
rubber and tin groups. He foresaw this being a problem for the almost 500,000 rubber
and tin workers once production levels started depleting or being replaced by other
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products. At that time, the United States had reported a new processing method for the
production of synthetic rubber at much lower costs, a process Gamba envisioned being
taken up by other countries. It did eventually happen and it was the Indian laborers that
bore the brunt of it as they lost their traditional source of livelihood.
A further subversion of Indian agency came in the form of an amalgamation of

unions under the umbrella of a conservation trade union called NUPW. Its leader, P.P.
Narayanan, was a rather unknown person among the larger Indian laboring community,
but one that caught the eye of John Brazier, the Trade Union Adviser of Malaya as a
potential British ally. Ramasamy has written extensively on the formation of the National
Union of Plantation Workers (NUPW).144 Until the introduction of the Emergency,
Brazier had little success in the promotion of unions rivaling the left-wing ones. Despite
the government machinery on his side, he was not able to influence the mass-based trade
unions organized under the Pan Malayan General Labor Unions (PMGLU). It was then
that he turned to little known leaders such as Narayanan. According to Ramasamy, “It
was on Narayanan that he placed much hope in providing the much needed leadership for
the development of alternative unions in the plantation sector.”145 The British recognized
in him someone who would put their policies into place. On November 2, 1954, the
National Union of Plantation Workers was officially formed. It was anointed by the
British High Commissioner, who declared, “By my presence I want you to know how
welcome is [sic] this important step you have taken.”146 That its membership was largely
Indian is indicative of the colonial way of maintaining dominance through segregation.
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The working-class racial unity that developed after the war was effectively broken down.
Gamba noted that “the NUPW leadership was content for its members to remain largely
Indian in order to retain hegemony and because it was administratively convenient, even
though the exclusiveness may have been at the expense of its bargaining power.”147 In the
end the Emergency period of “police and military repression, strict censorship of news
and information, [and] the powers of arbitrary arrest and detention, gave impetus to
conservative political and trade union organizations,” one of them being the NUPW.148
With the creation of the NUPW, the hopes of the Indian agricultural workers to
have a better life, was crushed. Agency was taken away from them, and they remained an
exploitable laboring class, with very few being able to free themselves from the horrible
cycle of poverty and destitution. Colonial dealings in Malaya ensured that the Indian
labor community would remain a permanent labor diaspora. However, an alternate
memory of them as being a people who struggled against the colonial power and who
achieved some victory; and a people who exercised their agency, even if it was for a brief
time, should exist. It inspires the community to believe in themselves and not always
think in terms of how others negatively perceive them. It gives a glimmer of hope to the
youth in the community to know that a long time ago, their forefathers did fight to make
their lives better.
Chapter 5 concludes this thesis with the recognition that a modern spirit was
displayed by Indian Tamils after World War II. In their resistance to colonial rule, Indians
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showed a defiant nature quite contrary to the colonial perception of them. Radical
unionism was a display of agency as Indians attempted to change the course of their lives
by taking on the British through strikes, the strongest weapon in their hands.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Schmidt and Patterson in their introduction to Making Alternate Histories,
observed that “the erasure of local histories,” was the main reason why it was important
to have a different perspective of history, as opposed to the accepted historical narrative
presented by those in power.149 An alternate perspective reveals how dominant forces
manipulate facts in order to present a picture that is only acceptable to them, and a picture
that presents them in good light. Their research provided “several insights on how
colonial and neo-colonial powers manipulate the production of histories, encouraging
certain forms of history while discouraging and even silencing others.”150 This thesis, like
the work presented in Schmidt and Patterson, gives an alternate perspective on how the
Indian labor struggles after World War II should be viewed. These struggles were a
display of agency and the start of modernity, something the state-sanctioned historical
narrative completely neglects because of the transition from colonialism to
neocolonialism that Malaya went through. As Patterson and Schmidt explain,
Whereas colonialism is the expression of power relations between
dominant metropolitan countries in the West and the politically,
economically, and culturally subordinated peoples on their margins,
neocolonialism is based on economic and cultural subordination in the
era after colonized peoples gained political independence. 151
The true account of Indian labor struggles has been hidden, giving an impression
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of a community that has always been inferior to the Malays and Chinese, one that never
stood up for anything, and one that's not able to succeed in life because it was lazy and
quite content with the little that it had. Such a view over time allowed for the continued
repression and manipulation of these people. Linguistics scholar Shanthini Pillai argues
that it is the subaltern nature of the Indian coming as an untouchable to Malaya to
perform menial work under imperial bidding, and as such seen as being only able to fill
insignificant roles, that has shaped the perception of Malayan Indians. She asserts that
they were subalterns,
... manipulated by the imperialists in their bid to secure a labor force, and
relentlessly accentuated in colonial discursive articulations of their
presence in Malaya; vestiges of its garb still cloak contemporary
Malaysia's perception of them.152
Pillai eloquently argues that this subaltern nature was never a given in the lives of
the Indians, since there were many moments in which they tried to break from the
shackles of colonialism through acts of insurgency. Yet, the present work shows that there
was a point in Malaya's history when these Indians went beyond acts of insurgency and
confronted the colonial power, placing themselves on an equal platform. They were no
longer interested in deserting the plantation life or settling for the little advances that
came their way. They wanted more. They wanted citizenship and rights. They wanted
fair wages and better living conditions. These rights they were willing to fight for and
they were willing to do it in collaboration with the other races. The imperatives of the
concept of unity within a plural society was not lost on them. It was only through unity
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that they could stand up to the British. It was only by supporting each others' demands
that they could possibly gain anything from the colonial power. The effect of World War
II therefore was to strip the Indian coolie of his subaltern nature and awaken in him a
character that was no longer willing to be subservient to the colonial power. Historian
Michael Morgan writes:
For the Indian worker in particular the war years were to be a baptism
in politics. He above all had been mystified by the paternalistic curtain
behind which the British exploited his cheap labor. Once it had been torn
down it was to prove extremely difficult to draw again.153
The Beginning of a Modern Spirit
Modernity in the Malayan Indian context was therefore that moment in history
when these Indian peasants decided to think decolonially. Walter Mignolo in his
criticism on Western notions of modernity said that, “the darker side or hidden agenda of
modernity was coloniality.”154 Colonialism in Malaya was to throw people back into a
pre-modern state. For the Indian peasantry, this was especially true. These were a people
who had embarked on a journey that took them away from their villages decades before,
where they lived under an oppressive caste system, only to find that their new
environment was not that dissimilar. In this new order, the Brahmins were in fact the
British, and they, the Tamils, remained a dispossessed community. In his discussion on
decolonial thinking, Mignolo stresses that it is important to not reject the colonial past
but rather to embrace it and re-imagine the society that one lives in. To think this way
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requires “changing the rules of the game rather than the content.”155 I assert that this was
the consciousness of the Indians in Malaya after the war. They could finally imagine a
better future for themselves, but they also realized that it was not going to happen without
a fight. Partha Chatterjee in The Nation and its Fragments, raised an important
observation of peasant consciousness in Colonial India which resonates with Mignolo's
decoloniality. He wrote that while nationalists tried to mobilize the peasantry into an anti
colonial force, the peasantry chose to “make sense of it not in terms of the discursive
forms of modern bourgeois politics but rather by translating it into their own codes,”
undergoing therefore “a quite radical transformation of meaning in the peasant domain of
politics.”156 Because Chatterjee was making an observation of a situation during colonial
occupation in India, it could be said that these peasants were already thinking
decolonially, and therefore being modern.
Similarly, the Malayan Indian laborers understood the ramifications of supporting
trade unions heavily influenced by communism. The All Malayan Rubber Workers
Council was in fact a communist creation. It gave voice to Indian workers grievances and
was a space in which they could make their stand. It was a justified cause given the
misery they were in. Aligning themselves with the Malayan Communist Party was a
calculated move. It was peasant politics being played out at a time when Western powers
were seeking to keep people in Asia under continued suppression.
Historian Barbara Watson Andaya contests the idea that all things “modern”
originated in Europe. She argues the need for broadening this idea of modernity in
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Southeast Asia in order to find “evidence of a modern spirit in earlier times.”157 The
emergence of a predominantly Indian trade union in the form of the AMRWC that stood
in support of both the Indian and Chinese working class, bridging the gap between old
cultural differences in a time when the world had witnessed a challenge to Western
dominance and hegemony, was in keeping with this 'modern spirit.' Naturally, criticisms
towards this trade union movement such as that by an Indian lawyer as quoted below,
would not have found favor with the AMRWC or any trade union movement in the
period concerned.
The present leaders of some of the trade unions lack the experience
which leaders in England and America have. The systems in England and
America have been developed 'gradually' and slowly from broad
precedent to precedent, and their machinery and the system under which
the machinery functions have been developed after a lapse of hundred
years at least. The leaders of some trade unions in Malaya are trying to
do overnight what the English and American trade unions are doing now.
They are ignorant imitators.158
Criticisms such as this from those within the echelons of the colonial structure
implied that Malayans needed to be taught trade unionism by the West. This sort of
thinking was as Dipesh Chakrabarthy argued, in line with the “first in the West, then all
else,” type of reasoning, giving credence only to those ideas coming out from the West.159
The Malayan working class was not waiting to be taught, rather they were going to
define the workings of unionism themselves. In its subversion of the trade union
movement, the British eventually proved that there was nothing modern about their brand
157

158

159

Barbara Watson Andaya, “Historicising 'Modernity ' in Southeast Asia,” Journal of the Economic and
Social history of the Orient 40, no. 4 (1997): 391-409.
Monthly Report on Labor Conditions – August, 1947, in Monthly Reports on Labor Conditions –
Reports on Labor Strikes and Disputes, 1947. Reports. 957/0291825, Malaysian National Archives,
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 6.

82
of trade unionism. It was a unionism that protected colonial interests and destroyed true
worker representation. It was repressive in nature and ensured the marginalization of the
Indian working class. This repression of colonial peoples was perhaps the Western notion
of modernity that the British was propagating throughout its colonies. However, over
time the colonial peoples appropriated this notion of modernity for themselves and began
to redefine it from their vantage point as is indicative of the Malayan Indian labor
struggles post World War II.
Ranajit Guha in his book Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial
India, recognized the peasant as being a modern person, insisting that “instead of being
an anachronism in a modernizing colonial world, the peasant was a real contemporary of
colonialism, a fundamental part of the modernity that colonial rule brought to India.”160
He stressed that theirs was not a “backward consciousness” but a consciousness that took
into account the political and economic institutions before them. They knew and
understood the power relations of their time. Peasant insurgency in India, Guha wrote,
was a political struggle.161 Similarly, the struggle of the Malayan Indian laborers after
the war should also be seen in the same light. These were a people who had partaken in
the colonial notion of “modernity,” thereby making them into a modern citizenry. They
no longer lived in the confines of a village that boxed them into subaltern roles. They
were free having discarded those chains generations before. They had the Japanese
invasion and the war to thank for stripping the colonial power of its veil of dominance.
All these experiences created a new consciousness in the Indian Tamil. A modern
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political consciousness that led to a political struggle.
Colonial documents however, were not going to paint the truth. Rather, these
sources were going to present all that happened post-World War II as a destruction of
civil order by diabolical forces that used the Indian and Chinese working class as pawns.
Morgan, writing on trade unionism after the war said that those interested in the history
of the Malayan working class had, “unfortunately to rely primarily on sources and
accounts largely hostile to the politics of the labor movement during the period under
consideration.” 162 This was not surprising given the need by the elite or the dominant
power to monopolize the public discourse. What was actually happening was a
contradiction to what the colonial power wanted to project of itself. As Scott said, “If a
'people's democracy' claims to exist to promote the interest of the working class, it cannot
easily explain why it is breaking strikes and jailing proletarians.”163
This was what colonialism did to Asia. It created muted voices in history, while
overwhelming it with a strong dominant narrative. The British never intended Malayans
to be free. It viewed racial unity in Malaya with pessimism. A pessimistic view was easy
to adopt when the British themselves knew how hard they had worked at and succeeded
in fomenting racial divisions in Malaya. The colonial power doubted the Malayan
peoples ability to bridge cultural differences and create a successful plural society
because they knew that the divisions were deep and would require extraordinary effort
from all the races to overcome. For their purposes, it was better to dissuade ideas of unity
and focus on the improbabilities of a racially united society. British intent after the war
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was the “creation of new Dominions, self-Governing but part of the Commonwealth
owing allegiance to the Crown.” They decided that Malaya was not ready for true selfgovernance and that the policy regarding self-governance in plural societies such as
these should be “the expression [and] not the instrument of unity.” They placed a
paternalistic tone on the creation of a Malayan nation by convincing themselves that the
Malayan people still needed and wanted British rule. The following quote by the
Secretary of State for the Colonies clearly shows this:
These fears [of communal violence] haunt the various races; none of them
in their heart of hearts wish to see us go. They still believe in British
justice. We must not break down their belief … All know that we are their
hope and stand-by. I say therefore, that we must persist. I believe that with
patience and wisdom there is a reasonable chance – if we are given the
time – of reaching our goal, a united Malayan nation within the British
Commonwealth and Empire.164
Statements like this gave the impression that the Malayan people themselves were
not convinced that there could be racial unity and therefore needed the colonial power to
act as an overseer and arbitrator. In truth, the colonial power was not ready to part from
its cash cow. It needed to stay as long as it could to milk the country of its resources. That
it could only do with the domination of Malaya's working class. It was certainly not
going to allow Malayans to experience their own version of modernity. Demands for selfgovernance, self-organization, and an end to exploitation were all appalling thoughts to
the imperial power. Rediker and Linebaugh wrote that self-organization was a threat to
the ruling class, whose sole concern was the manipulation and exploitation of cheap
labor.165 Similarly, the Malayan peoples' demand for independence and self-governance
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was a threat to the imperialists.
Bassey W. Andah wrote that the practice of archeology in Africa needed to be
rewritten if it was to yield “inside” history and “an authentic African biography such that
the ordinary African is enabled to rediscover a true historical self (individual, social, and
cultural) and thus a sense of history and creativity.”166 Similarly, a different approach
needs to be taken in the study of history in Malaysia. History as Malaysians know it,
needs to be rewritten in order to strip it of its colonial and neo colonial traits. This
process of stripping away is especially beneficial to the Indian community, as a
marginalized race in Malaysia. It is empowering for such a community to know the truth.
It is important that such a community should know that it was involved in a project for
modernity and self-independence years before as it is empowering knowledge, if nothing
else came out of it. For their own personal empowerment, a different version of history as
opposed to the usual narrative is necessary in motivating them to strive for a better life. It
presents them a picture contrary to one which maintains them as a subaltern community.
Looking for Evidence of Modernity
In his analysis of the different approaches taken by scholars on the subject of
modernity, historian Frederick Cooper concluded that it was important to not just focus
on the Euro-centric notion of modernity but take into account the debate and struggles
that emerged out of the spaces where this was contested. He said:
The struggles were unequal, but they were not one-sided. Colonial voices
might have to shout to be heard in European capitals, but at critical
moments, the intensity of colonial conflicts, uncertainties about colonial
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policies, disagreements between those who wanted to save souls and
those who wanted exploit bodies, and competing visions of national
missions and national interests provided fissures that colonized subjects,
….. were able to pry open.167
Cooper's encouragement to listen to what was being said about modernity in the
world is a useful approach in trying to locate modernity in any situation. In the Malayan
context, the struggle put up by the Indian and Chinese working class post World War II
exposed the colonial power's selfish motives. Labor struggles exposed the colonial
power's idea of wanting to create a society that was acceptable to its own notion of what
was right. The Malayan people as a whole wanted something better after the war. To
“listen” as Cooper said, to the voices emerging out of the war, was to recognize this
desire. Self-governance, independence, better jobs and higher wages, were all cries for a
life free of colonial rule. In a situation where such voices were muted, it is difficult to
obtain evidence that voices such as these ever existed, however, evidence of these voices
can be found.
People were not afraid to speak boldly, one of the first indications that they were
ready to embrace modernity. The language against the colonial power was
confrontational and no longer docile. Ramasamy, writing on the influence of the All
Malayan Rubber Workers Council, quotes a trade union leader saying the following while
addressing estate workers in 1947:
Workers, the Manager is afraid of the Labour Union in as much as to say
that the Union will instill into your head to demand better wages and
better living conditions. Look at your houses, what are they? Mere
replicas of pig-stys? Workers, why must you suffer so. This world is not
for the capitalists, who number a mere fraction against countless hoards
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of workers.168
Slogans written in Chinese reading,”Fellow workers! Let us use the strength of
united action to smash the UPAM's entry [sic] for wage cut and retrenchment of
employees;” “Hold firmly to the demand of Indian workers for a 100 percent increase for
wages,” and, “Support with determination the call of the All Malaya Workers United
Committee,” were of special significance.169 These slogans were of importance because
they were written in Chinese for Chinese but in support of the Indians, indicating a
working class solidarity – another marker for modernity. While colonial rule created and
encouraged divisions, this new consciousness amongst the working class was striving for
unity. This show of solidarity was quite contrary to the Colonial Secretary's statement
that the Malayan people had “fears of communal violence.”170
Another instance is seen in a letter to the British newspaper Daily Herald on
March 29, 1950 from H.B. Lim, the editor of the Malayan Monitor, in response to an
editorial written by the Daily Herald regarding the Malayan revolt. It condemned the
newspaper for its biased reporting of the situation in Malaya. The letter stated that the
editorial attacked the “Malayan Liberation movement as 'murder, arson and terrorism,'”
therefore giving the impression that the revolt in Malaya, did not exist. The letter urged
the British public to consider why such a show of military force was necessary if the
problem in Malaya was merely one of 'murder, arson, and terrorism.' Its claim that the
“heavy concentration of British army, navy and air force [had] after 22 months, signally
168
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failed to quell the 'murder, arson and terrorism,'” raised the question if there was more to
this picture. This show of force during the Emergency, it claimed, of some 120,000
British, Gurka, and Special Constabulary signified that, “.. the British forces must
indubitably be up against something far more widespread and far more rooted in the
people of the country, than mere 'murder, arson and terrorism.'” Using Cooper's approach
in “listening” to what was being said about modernity, this letter is then significant as it
claims that what was actually happening in Malaya was a people's revolution or
movement, and it was a movement under siege. It was one that was being wrongly
represented to the British people. H.B. Lim asserted:
The facts are plain. The Malayan people are fighting to be free. They
have no wish to kill for the sake of killing; but it is Britain’s imperialist
policy which demands that they should be put down with force. Every
freedom loving and peaceful people opposes such a policy. Not to do so
would be a total surrender to slavery, and the perpetuation of the crime
of exploitation of one people by another.171
Yet another instance is found in a letter written to Frederick William Dalley, one
of the co-authors of the Dalley-Awberry Report, by a former Assistant Trade Union
Adviser whose employment was terminated. When locals within the colonial structure
recognized the problems about colonial rule and became vocal about these problems,
they were dismissed. Colonial rule did not tolerate subversion. When that subversion
came from those who were singled out to assist the colonial power, it was not tolerated.
M.S. Dhoss was terminated on the suspicion that he was sympathetic to the workers'
grievances. He wrote this letter with the intention of pointing out all the problems he
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recognized as being detrimental to the relationship between workers and the colonial
power. As someone who worked closely with the workers he could point out succinctly
what was being demanded by the workers and what were their grievances. What stands
out in his letter is his denouncement of the Labor Department. He wrote that, “.. [the]
department which is supposed to look after the interests of the worker has not fully
appreciated the worker as human and hence the gulf between them is growing.” His letter
pointed out that the lack of understanding between the central authority and the workers
was the main cause of distrust. The colonial power did not truly appreciate the problems
workers were facing. With the standard of living higher than before the war, daily wages
were inadequate to make ends meet. Workers wanted better wages. They wanted
employers to listen to their problems. They wanted adult education in order to find better
jobs. None of these were of concern to the colonial power who was solely interested in
getting the machinery of capitalism running again. Dhoss wrote that the harsh Emergency
regulations were curtailing personal freedom and,“when and if this is denied, democracy
becomes a farce.” Dhoss also argued that his termination was unfair and illegal,
stating,“British justice is something that anybody should be proud of for it is built on the
assumption that a man is innocent till he is proven guilty.” Dhoss accused the British of
“high-handed” action saying that he was sure this would not have happened if he were a
European.172
Those whom the British had set apart to “run” Malayan affairs were increasingly
becoming critical of colonial ways. Another instance in which we “listen” to this voice
for change is in an article written by Ooi Thiam Siew, Secretary to the Penang Division
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of the Malayan Trade Union Council. Ooi gained recognition among the British as
someone who would make a good trade union leader. As such, he was sent to Britain to
learn about the workings of trade unionism under the tutelage of known union leaders.
However, Ooi developed his own opinions and criticisms about the situation in Malaya,
writing to authorities regarding all the appalling conditions he saw. He was especially
concerned about the rubber plantation workers as he believed that they were the
“backbone of … the working class movement in this country.” He said,
It is tragic that employing interests and Government are not acutely aware
of the need to satisfy the human needs of the tappers. It would be a real
calamity for this country if we were to value the tapper more for his
output than for his human personality. Such mistaken ideas of human
values in this democratic era are – in the words of the General Secretary
of the Malayan Trade Union Council - “a subsidy for communism.”173
Ooi argued that the workers only wanted “a fair wage for their toil,” and that the
employers “had not proved that the rubber industry could not pay what the workers asked
for.” Bringing up testimonies held before the Whitton Arbitration Tribunal and Justice
Taylor, Ooi pointed out that the planters were “holding back facts of production costs
from impartial arbitrators,” thereby showing “a lack of faith by employers in negotiations
and arbitration,” and “making a mockery of democratic institutions and procedure.” On
the other hand, Ooi said that “unions leaders .. gave conclusive evidence on both
occasions that efficient estates could well afford to pay the rates asked for by the unions
and still pay dividends to shareholders, even if the price of rubber went down to fifty
cents per pound.”174 Ooi was in fact challenging the colonial authorities and accusing
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them of exploitation, a dangerous road to take as it would embolden the working class to
stand up for their rights. In trying to make his case of exploitation even stronger, Ooi
quotes Richard Deverall, an American Trade Unionist who met with planters when he
visited Malaya in 1950 under the aegis of the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions' Mission:
Many of the plantations pay their stockholders annual dividends of 25
per cent, 50 per cent and up to 150 per cent! Contrasting this against the
mud huts and the degraded lives of the working people, one appreciates
the exploitation of the Asian plantation economy.175
When the mission asked the planters the number of vacation days the rubber tappers were
allowed, the planters replied, “Well, we allow them three days free time per year!” When
pressed further by Deverall if the tappers had Sundays off, the reply was, “Well, they can
have it if they want, but they are so anxious to make money and they like their work so
much that we just can't keep them from working.”176 Revealing these facts, Ooi in his
position as a trade unionist was breaking away from the colonial power's notion of what
unionists would stand for. He was not going to be a stooge of the British. In speaking this
kind of language, leaders like Ooi were in a good position to mobilize the already
discontented workers into fighting the colonial power. His use of language was of vital
importance as he said that the workers “right to live” was more than just an ideal. “It is a
fundamental human right. It means that all workers must be paid a living wage. While it
is debatable what should constitute a living wage, here in Malaya, it is not difficult to
assess what should be the minimum required to keep a worker and his family from
starving.” He saw the arguments put up by employers such as, “We cannot pay them,”
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and, “If they want such wages, we have to close down our business,” as nothing more
than mere excuses. He said,
Such excuses by employers are not valid when wages paid to workmen
are not even sufficient for mere subsistence. It is inhuman. To all who
believe that this is not so, I will quote the words of Mr Frank Walsh:
“The industry which cannot pay a living wage has no right to exist. It is
profiteering in human blood and tears.” Therefore, I appeal to all workers
in Malaya – Keep up the struggle for your right to live. Fight a clean
democratic fight. With unity and the will to win, you can achieve a better
life for yourselves and your families.
That last invocation was especially important when considering modernity. It was a call
to not accept things as they were but to resist and strive for something better. Ooi was
pointing out that the system as it stood, was not a democracy, but, as Dhoss also pointed
out, a “farce.” In encouraging a spirit of resistance and urging the workers to put up a
democratic fight, Ooi was asking them to take on a modern consciousness – a significant
marker of modernity.
Mobilization, according to Ranajit Guha, was divided into two categories. In the
“domain of elite politics mobilization was achieved vertically whereas that in the domain
of subaltern politics was achieved horizontally.” While the former was more “cautious
and controlled,” the latter was “more spontaneous.” Subaltern politics in India involved
those who came together through an organization of “kinship and territoriality or on class
association.”177 While in India this popular mobilization “was realized in its most
comprehensive form in peasant uprisings,” in Malaya it took the form of labor strikes and
organized revolts under the influence of the MCP. It was a mobilization of the working
class that cut across the boundaries of race. It was a struggle against imperialist
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exploitation, thus the beginning of modernity in Malaya. On the part of the British, it was
the need to repress this insurgency so rubber revenues would not be affected which led to
draconian Emergency regulations and the increase in British forces in Malaya. As the
Malayan Monitor reported,
The rubber imperialists are therefore, making hay while the sinking sun
still shines a little, and are at the same time howling for more British
troops to be sent to stem the tide of defeat. More blood for more profits is
an appropriate slogan for the financial manipulators of British and
Malayan lives.178
Present Day Indian Struggles in Malaysia
November 25, 2007 was a significant day for the Malaysian Indian Tamil
community. 20,000 people gathered in an unprecedented show of protest towards the
Government of Malaysia. They marched to the British Embassy in Kuala Lumpur to
deliver a 100, 000 signature memorandum to the Queen of England. The memorandum
urged the Queen to help this Indian community by appointing a Queen's Counsel to
represent them in a legal case against the British Government. It claimed that actions of
the former colonizer abandoned them to harsh discriminatory policies that ensured the
continued marginalization of Indians and their future generations through the unfair
practices of the Malaysian Government.
The said legal case was a class action suit filed by P. Waytha Moorthy, a lawyer
representing the Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF), for USD 4 trillion. The suit
that was filed on August 31, 2007, incidentally the 50th anniversary of Malaysia's
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independence, specifically stated that it was seeking damages from the British
government for “150 years of exploitation.”179 HINDRAF's legal adviser, Uthayakumar
Ponnusamy said that, “The British brought us here, exploited us for 150 years and left us
to the mercy of a Malay Muslim government. They should compensate us now.”180 The
march to the British High Commission was prevented by the police who had refused to
grant a permit for the rally. Roadblocks were set up to screen motorists entering the city
center with the purpose of identifying trouble makers. Members of the public were urged
to stay away from the rally. Foreign media, like Al Jazeera, documented the excessive use
of force by the police in the form of tear gas and water canons. Although the
memorandum was never delivered that day, HINDRAF claimed to have faxed it to the
British High Commission. The High Commissioner, Boyd McCleary, issued a statement
on November 28, 2007 saying that the Commission had been prepared to accept the
petition but it was never delivered. On the HINDRAF claim that the memorandum was
faxed, the Commissioner said that some information was received but declined to
elaborate on its nature.
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, then Prime Minister warned that the government would
invoke the Internal Security Act (ISA) against the demonstrators if needed. The ISA was
a legacy of the British which was first introduced under the Emergency Regulations
Ordinance of 1948 as “preventive detention.” When the Emergency ended in 1960, the
ordinance was repealed and the government passed the Internal Security Act under the
authority of Article 149 of the Malaysian Constitution. The ISA has been criticized
179
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repeatedly by both international and domestic human rights organizations including
Human Rights Watch, the Malaysian Bar Council, and the Malaysian Human Rights
Commission on grounds that it violates fundamental international standards.181 The
Malaysian Human Rights Commission or SUHAKAM is however limited in the amount
of pressure it can exert as it is an organization established by the Malaysian Parliament
under the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999, Act 597, and therefore
under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's Department. The ISA allows for the
detention of any person the police deems as a threat for up to 60 days, a period in which
legal counsel is denied. As long as there is, “a suspicion that an individual has acted or is
about to act or is likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or
any part thereof or to the maintenance of essential services therein or to the economic
life thereof,” that individual can be arrested under the ISA. Because the use of the Act has
been repeatedly criticized by human rights groups and members of the public, the
Malaysian government under Prime Minister Najib Razak announced that it would be
replaced by the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012. This new Act was passed
by the Parliament and given the royal assent on 18 June 2012. However it has yet to
come into force and is still awaiting an announcement by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Two days before the HINDRAF rally, three lawyers including Waytha Moorthy
were arrested for allegedly making seditious remarks but were subsequently released
when the prosecution could not provide the trial judge with the necessary evidence. On
the 26 of November, Waytha Moorthy was released. He left Malaysia before the ISA
could be invoked on him. He was granted amnesty by the British Government and lived
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in London till this year. While in London, his Malaysian passport was revoked and he
was given special documents by the United Nations to travel on. His main efforts while
in exile included rallying support for HINDRAF and the Malaysian Indian cause around
the world.
The significance of the HINDRAF led rally was the fact that it garnered the
support of the other races in Malaysia. Having brought their grievances to the forefront,
Indians drew the support of the Chinese and the Malays in the country and this was
manifested in the outcome of the 12th Malaysian general elections of 2008. The ruling
UMNO led government lost its two thirds majority in Parliament simply because of the
swing in Indian votes and those that supported HINDRAF. The racial solidarity is
reminiscent of the unity shown after the war. It made a significant impact then and here
again. The 13th Malaysian general elections is set to take place by the end of this year. It
will be interesting to see if the homecoming of Waytha Moorthy will have an influence
on the Indian Tamil community and if this will impact the next elections.
The fact that such an event as the HINDRAF rally took place in the 21st century
is of great historical significance. It supports the idea behind this thesis that a colonial
subversion indeed happened. Like the group's claim, this thesis also states that the
British were responsible for the suffering of this former labor diaspora. Indian Tamils
were denied agency after World War II and that denial of agency had serious
consequences. As a minority race, the community was thrown into the backwaters. All
opportunity for upward mobility was destroyed and they were pushed to the fringes of
society where they and their progeny would suffer poverty and destitution. Vestiges of
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colonialism still cling on them like ugly rags. They seem to have remained, untouchables
from those remote South Indian villages, who were crammed unto steamers and brought
to Malayan ports to work on coolie lines all over the country so very long ago.
Susan Johnson spoke of the power of memory and remembering. She hoped that
alternate memories, rather than historical memories would separate difference from
domination.182 Alternate memories lend a voice to modern day struggles. Instead of
looking at the period after the war as a time in history when people lost out to
domination, perhaps inspiration can be drawn from the fight that was put up and the show
of agency. The present generation of Indian youth can draw hope and strength from an
alternate historical perspective of their forefathers. Perhaps the march organized on
November 25, 2007 signifies another moment for change in the lives of this former labor
diaspora. It's history in the making and certainly one to be watched carefully.
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